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INTRODUCTION
Baseball is widely regarded as America’s pastime.  With that designation comes 
certain expectations from the American public about the integrity of the game.  
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) has faced challenges to that integrity in the past, 
including gambling and drug use, but its response has generally been timely and 
adequate.1 To the extent these controversies involved illegal activity, the 
government has stepped in accordingly.2
Presently, the sport is mired in a well documented controversy regarding player 
use of performance enhancing drugs.
By and large, the government has not had 
to police the league itself.
3 This time, however, MLB’s response was 
slow and insufficient.4 As a result, each branch of the government got involved.  
President George W. Bush directly addressed the issue in his State of the Union 
Address on January 20, 2004, calling on “team owners, union representatives, 
coaches and players to take the lead, to send the right signal, to get tough and to get 
rid of steroids now.”5
1. The “Black Sox Scandal” involved the Chicago White Sox intentionally losing the 1919 
World Series as part of a gambling conspiracy to fix the outcome of the series.  See generally 1919
BLACK SOX.COM, http://www.1919blacksox.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).  In 1989, Pete Rose, then-
manager of the Cincinnati Reds, was accused of placing bets on his own team.  See generally Rose 
Admits to Betting on Reds ‘Every Night’, ESPN.COM (Mar. 16, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/
On March 17–18, 2005, six players and four executives 
testified before the House Committee on Government Reform regarding drug use in 
news/story?id=2798498.
The drug controversy that is the subject of this Note is not baseball’s first bout with illegal 
substance abuse.  In the early to mid 1980s, cocaine use was prevalent among players, particularly in the 
Pittsburgh area.  See Alan Schwarz, Remembering the Pain of the Pittsburgh Drug Trials, ESPN.COM
(July 17, 2002), http://a.espncdn.com/mlb/columns/schwarz_alan/1406651.html.
Following both the Black Sox Scandal and the Pete Rose gambling allegations, MLB issued 
lifetime bans to the individuals involved.  See generally Rose Admits to Betting on Reds ‘Every Night’,
supra (stating Rose received a lifetime ban in 1989 after an investigation concluded he bet on baseball); 
The Trial, 1919 BLACK SOX.COM, http://www.1919blacksox.com/trial4.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2010) 
(stating all eight “Black Sox” players were given lifetime bans immediately following trial).  MLB 
offered its own version of a plea deal to players who cooperated with a government investigation into
their cocaine use, allowing the players to avoid suspensions of up to one year.  James Lincoln Ray, The 
Pittsburgh Drug Trials, SUITE101.COM (July 6, 2008), http://www.suite101.com/content/the-pittsburgh-
baseball-drug-trials-a59057.
2. The State of Illinois tried seven players and two gamblers on five counts, including 
conspiracy to defraud the public.  The Trial, 1919 BLACK SOX.COM, http://www.1919blacksox.com/
trial2.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).  All nine defendants were acquitted. The Trial, 1919 BLACK 
SOX.COM, http://www.1919blacksox.com/trial3.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).  Several players testified 
before a Pittsburgh grand jury regarding their cocaine use, which led to the subsequent pleas or 
convictions of seven drug dealers.  Ron Cook, The Eighties:  A Terrible Time of Trial and Error,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 29, 2000), http://www.post-gazette.com/pirates/
200009291980bucs3.asp.
3. Entire web sites are dedicated to following this controversy.  See, e.g., BASEBALL’S STEROID 
ERA, http://www.baseballssteroidera.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).  For the purposes of this Note, any 
reference to “drug use,” the “drug problem” or the “drug controversy” in baseball shall refer to the use 
of steroids and other performance enhancing drugs (“PEDs”).
4. See infra Part I.
5. President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2004, at A19.
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baseball.6 During that same year, members of Congress introduced at least three 
bills aimed at curbing the drug problem in professional sports.7 Each bill required 
all players in the four major professional sports leagues to submit to mandatory 
uniform testing for performance enhancing drugs (“PEDs”).8 Meanwhile, federal 
investigators began targeting an illegal drug ring in Northern California, which 
subsequently ballooned into protracted litigation.9 The origin and resolution of 
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. is the primary focus of this 
Note.10
On April 8, 2004, government agents entered the facilities of Comprehensive 
Drug Testing (“CDT”) and Quest Diagnostics with warrants pursuant to its 
investigation of the Bay Area Lab Co-Operative (“BALCO”).11 Both warrants 
were limited to information related to ten named players with connections to 
BALCO, yet the government seized an entire directory containing records for 
hundreds of players and many other people with no connection to baseball.12 This 
directory included a listing of all players who tested positive for PEDs under the 
“2003 Survey Testing.”13 After a lengthy judicial process, the Ninth Circuit held 
the seizure unlawful.14
At first glance, this seizure is simply “an obvious case of deliberate 
overreaching by the government in an effort to seize data as to which it lacked 
probable cause.”15
6. See generally Duff Wilson, McGwire Offers No Denials at Steroid Hearings, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2005, at A1.
However, for the victims of the seizure—MLB players—it is 
anything but simple.  MLB players contractually agreed to the confidentiality of 
7. The Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005); The Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 
3084, 109th Cong. (2005); Integrity in Professional Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005).  The 
counterpart to the Clean Sports Act of 2005 was also introduced in the House of Representatives.  H.R. 
2565, 109th Cong. (2005).
8. The major professional sports leagues are MLB, the National Football League (“NFL”), the 
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) and the National Hockey League (“NHL”).  The Drug Free 
Sports Act, H.R. 1862, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); S. 1114 § 4(b); S. 1960 § 6(a).  Congress ultimately 
dropped its pursuit of this legislation largely due to MLB’s implementation of a tougher drug testing 
policy.  Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, ESPN.COM (Nov. 15, 2005),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2224832 (quoting Sen. Jim Bunning, R-Ky.:  “I and my 
colleagues will be watching very closely, and if things unravel, we still have tough legislation we can 
move through Congress.”).
9. See infra Part II.
10. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT III), 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (per curiam).
11. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT I), 513 F.3d 1085, 1092–93 (9th 
Cir. 2008).  BALCO was founded by Victor Conte in 1984.  Tom Goldman, BALCO Founder Victor 
Conte Back at His Lab, NPR (June 21, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
11258081. Presumably due in part to its location in Burlingame, California, a suburb a few miles south 
of San Francisco, many of BALCO’s clients were professional athletes with connections to the Bay Area 
(e.g., Barry Bonds, Jason Giambi and multiple players on the Oakland Raiders).  Mark Fainaru-Wada & 
Lance Williams, How the Doping Scandal Unfolded, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 21, 2003, at B1.
12. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1091–92; CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1166.
13. See infra Part I (discussing the “2003 Survey Testing” and the list of positive test results).
14. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1174.
15. Id. at 1172.
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their test results, only to see them fall into the hands of a federal investigator who 
allegedly had ulterior motives—including a personal vendetta against a player 
whom he did not know personally.16 To further compound the problem, the names 
of four players who tested positive for PEDs were leaked to the media while those 
names were under court seal.17 The source(s) of the leak remains unknown, but it 
was almost certainly a government attorney or investigator.18
Professional athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy, not an 
expectation of diminished rights under contract.  Moreover, an individual’s fourth 
amendment rights do not depend on his or her status in the public eye.
In both instances, the 
actions of government personnel resulted in a breach of the players’ contractual 
right of confidentiality.
19
Part I provides a brief overview of the drug problem in Major League Baseball, 
exploring the recent use of performance enhancing drugs and the creation of “the 
List,” what ultimately became of the property that the investigators seized.
The 
BALCO investigation illustrates how the sports world’s interaction with the law 
extends far beyond the worlds of antitrust, contracts and tort into privacy and 
constitutional law.  Unfortunately, it also demonstrates how ill equipped the legal 
system is to protect professional athletes when those rights are violated.
20 Part 
II explores the federal investigation, which originated in a dumpster and eventually 
spread to multiple courtrooms.21 Part III analyzes the players’ legal rights 
implicated by the government seizure and the subsequent disclosure of certain 
information to the media.22
I.  BASEBALL’S DRUG PROBLEM
Finally, Part IV evaluates the players’ existing 
remedies and, to the extent those remedies are insufficient, proposes new means to 
protect players’ rights during future federal investigations.
Steroids were prevalent in baseball since the 1980s, but little attention was given 
to the issue.23 Despite that decade’s cocaine scandal, the team owners failed to get 
any form of drug testing into the 1990 collective bargaining agreement.24 The 
players’ union took the position that drug use warranted treatment, not punishment, 
and that testing violated the players’ privacy rights.25
16. Id. at 1166; see infra Part IV.A.2.
Four years later, negotiation 
17. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part III.A.1.
20. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part III.A.2.
23. Peter Gammons, The High Cost of Doing Nothing, ESPN.COM (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/gammons/story?id=2002123.
24. See Schwarz, supra note 1; see also Shaun Assael & Peter Keating, Who Knew?, ESPN THE 
MAGAZINE (Nov. 21, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=steroids&num=4.
25. Assael & Keating, supra note 24.  MLB players, along with managers, coaches and trainers, 
are represented by a union known as the Major League Baseball Players Association (hereinafter the 
“MLBPA” or the “Players Association”).  MLBPA Info:  Frequently Asked Questions,
MLBPLAYERS.COM, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#membership (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
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of the next labor agreement broke down, leading to the cancellation of nearly 1,000 
games over two seasons, including the 1994 World Series.26 Anxious to reach a 
settlement and begin the 1995 season, team owners acquiesced to the union’s 
resistance to formal drug testing.27 It wasn’t until one reporter’s chance discovery 
in a team locker room a few years later that Major League Baseball publicly 
confronted the steroid issue for the first time.28
A. RECENT USE OF PERFORMANCE ENHANCING DRUGS
In July 1998, an Associated Press (“AP”) writer covering the pursuit of the 
single season home run record noticed a small brown bottle of androstenedione in 
Mark McGwire’s locker.29 After the AP story broke one month later, MLB 
Commissioner Bud Selig publicly ignored McGwire’s andro use despite the fact 
that the Olympics and the NFL had banned the substance.30 Instead, he made the 
following remarks: “I think what Mark McGwire has accomplished is so 
remarkable, and he has handled it all so beautifully, we want to do everything we 
can to enjoy a great moment in baseball history.”31 Even at season’s end, Selig’s 
tune was unchanged: “None of this should ever diminish from Mark McGwire’s 
extraordinary season.”32 The national media also largely ignored the issue, instead 
heaping praise on McGwire and Sammy Sosa.33
This discovery was nonetheless a major catalyst in the discussion over steroid 
use in Major League Baseball.34 Despite his outward lack of concern, Selig began 
investigating the effects of drug use on player performance.35
26. Assael & Keating, supra note 24.
At the same time, 
players and team medical personnel began expressing concern over the prevalence 
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Androstenedione (“andro”) is a steroid precursor that was classified as a controlled 
substance under the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, 108 Pub. L. 358, 118 Stat. 1661 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 802(41)(A)(iv) (2006)) (defining andro as an anabolic steroid); see also 21 
U.S.C. § 812 (2006) (listing anabolic steroid as a Schedule III controlled substance).  In 1961, Roger 
Maris of the New York Yankees set the then-single-season record with sixty-one home runs.  McGwire 
Apologizes to La Russa, Selig, ESPN.COM (Jan. 12, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/
story?id=4816607.  During the 1998 season, Mark McGwire (seventy) and Sammy Sosa (sixty-six) 
challenged, and ultimately surpassed, Maris’s record to much fanfare nationwide.  Id.; see also Assael & 
Keating, supra note 24.  Their “home run chase,” as it is often called, is widely credited with 
reinvigorating interest in Major League baseball, which had reached a low point following the 1994–95 
strike.  See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 6.  Barry Bonds broke the record three years later by hitting 
seventy-three home runs during the 2001 season.  See Assael & Keating, supra note 24.  All three men 
have been linked to the performance enhancing drug controversy.  See, e.g., infra note 200 (McGwire); 
infra note 73 (Sosa); infra note 93 (Bonds).
30. Assael & Keating, supra note 24, at 8.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (noting that Sports Illustrated named both McGwire and Sosa its 1998 Sportsman of the 
Year and did not mention McGwire’s andro use in its story).
34. See id.
35. See generally id.
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of drug use in baseball.36 Selig instituted in season testing for baseball’s minor 
league players in 2001, the results of which were alarming: more than 500 players, 
roughly eleven percent of players on affiliated minor league teams, had tested 
positive for PEDs.37 Finally, in 2002, baseball’s drug problem resurfaced both at 
the negotiating table and on the newswire.38
The owners’ collective bargaining agreement proposal to the players included 
drug testing during the season.39 The union opposed the plan on principle, but its 
stance soon shifted under the weight of increasing media attention.40 Finally, on 
August 30, 2002, the two sides agreed to steroid testing for the first time.41 The 
2002 program provided for anonymous drug testing in 2003.42 The players 
received assurances that the results would remain anonymous and confidential.43 If
at least five percent of the players tested positive for steroids, mandatory random 
testing would be implemented the following season.44 On November 13, 2003, 
MLB announced that five to seven percent of players tested positive for steroids.45
Since the initial results exceeded the stipulated threshold, mandatory random 
testing began during the 2004 season.46 During the 2004 season, twelve out of 
1,133 tests yielded undisputed positive results for steroids.47 However, the 
inaugural program did not provide penalties for a first time offender.48
36. See id.
Thus, the 
37. Id. Baseball’s minor league system is a hierarchy of leagues that operate at levels below that 
of MLB.  See generally How Minor League Baseball Teams Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/minor-league-baseball-team.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).  
The levels range from the introductory rookie league up to AAA, directly below MLB.  See id.  Minor 
league teams are often affiliated with major league teams; these affiliations allow MLB to dictate league 
operation, including drug testing and penalties.  See id.; see also Michael Schmidt, Baseball Using 
Minor Leagues for a Drug Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A1.
38. Assael & Keating, supra note 24.
39. Id.
40. Id.  Two major revelations at the beginning of the 2002 season were largely responsible for 
the media frenzy.  In May, Jose Canseco, the 1988 American League MVP, told a Fox Sports Net 
interviewer that eighty-five percent of all players were on PEDs.  Canseco Refuses to Answer if He Has 
Taken Steroids, ESPN.COM (May 17, 2002) http://a.espncdn.com/mlb/news/2002/0517/1383821.html.  
In the June 3 issue of Sports Illustrated, Ken Caminiti, the 1996 National League MVP, admitted to the 
magazine that he took steroids and that at least half of the league did so as well.  Tom Verducci, Totally 
Juiced, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 2002, at 36.
41. Murray Chass, Last-Minute Deal in Baseball Talks Prevents a Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2002, at A1.
42. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING 
SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 54 (2007).  Hereinafter, the inaugural testing is 
referred to as the “2003 Survey Testing.”
43. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010).
44. MITCHELL, supra note 42.
45. Jack Curry & Jere Longman, Results of Steroid Testing Spur Baseball to Set Tougher Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at A1.
46. MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 54–55.
47. Id. at 55.
48. Barry M. Bloom, MLB Bans Use of Androstenedione, MLB.COM (June 29, 2004),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20040629&content_id=783595&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp
&c_id=mlb.
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2004 testing resulted in no player suspensions.49 This program drew scrutiny for 
perceived weaknesses in its testing procedures and penalties during a Senate 
subcommittee hearing in March 2004.50
In 2005, MLB announced two major revisions to its drug testing program.  On 
January 13, 2005, it instituted the following changes: 1) off season random testing; 
2) multiple random tests during the season; 3) the addition of human growth 
hormone (“HGH”), steroid precursors and ephedra to the list of banned drugs; and 
4) a penalty structure featuring a ten day suspension for the first offense, thirty day 
suspension for the second, sixty day suspension for the third and one year 
suspension for the fourth.51 Once again, members of Congress used the forum of a 
subcommittee hearing to voice their dissatisfaction with the strength of the 
program.52 This led to the second revision, announced on November 15, 2005, 
which provided for a tougher penalty structure—a fifty game suspension for the 
first offense, a hundred game suspension for the second offense and a lifetime ban 
for the third, subject to the right to apply for reinstatement after two years.53 The 
revised policy also required testing for amphetamines for the first time, providing 
an alternative penalty structure for positive test results.54
In March 2006, Commissioner Selig appointed former Senator George Mitchell 
to conduct an independent investigation into the extent of performance enhancing 
drug use in baseball.55 The Mitchell Report, submitted on December 13, 2007, 
named eighty-nine current and former players with some connection to 
performance enhancing drugs.56  The report also contained recommendations for 
changes to baseball’s drug policy, which MLB and the Major League Baseball 
Players Association (MLBPA) agreed to adopt in full in April 2008.57 While some 
regard the current policy as the strongest in professional sports, it continues to 
receive criticism as not meeting the “universally accepted standards” of the 
international antidoping code.58 Most notably, the MLB program bans human 
growth hormone but does not test for it.59
49. MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 55.
The jury is out on whether baseball has 
truly put the so-called “Steroid Era” behind it, or whether it has simply ushered in 
50. Id. at 56–57.
51. John O’Neil & Murray Chase, Baseball Players to Face More Drug Tests and Tougher 
Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/13/sports/baseball/13cnd-
base.html?_r=1&sq=january%2013%202005%20drug%20program&st=cse.
52. Jack Curry, Congress Fires Questions Hard and Inside, and Baseball Can Only Swing and 
Miss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at D1.
53. Jack Curry, Baseball Backs Stiffer Penalties for Steroid Use, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at 
A1.
54. Id.
55. MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 2.
56. See generally id.
57. Barry M. Bloom, MLB, Union Formalize New Drug Policy, MLB.COM (Apr. 11, 2008),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20080411&content_id=2515782&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp
&c_id=mlb.
58. Id.; WADA:  MLB Should Toughen on Cheats, ESPN.COM (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/news/story?id=4818799.
59. WADA:  MLB Should Toughen on Cheats, supra note 58.
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the “HGH Era” through its refusal to test for the hormone.60
B. THE “LIST”
The results of the 2003 Survey Testing have generated intense public interest in 
the identities of players who tested positive for steroids.61 The testing was 
anonymous and the players were not informed whether they tested positive or what 
substance triggered the positive result.62 Nonetheless, some players have been 
forced to deal with the consequences of public disclosure of their positive test 
results.63  This disclosure traces its roots to two events: one, the Players 
Association did not immediately destroy the results; and two, the government 
seized them pursuant to a warrant in the BALCO investigation.64
The government planned to use the results to question players about where and 
how they obtained the substance responsible for the positive test.65  To this end, 
investigators prepared a list of positive test results.66 The legitimacy of the List is 
questionable, however.  First, the actual number of players with a positive test 
result is in dispute.  Preliminary reports indicated that between forty-two and 
eighty-three players tested positive under the program.67 The Mitchell Report later 
put the figure at ninety-six positive results out of 1,369 tests, thirteen of which were 
in dispute.68 Second, the number of names on the List is 104, which MLB has 
noted is eight players more than the maximum number of positive test results, 
ninety-six.69
60. See Holli N. Heiles, Baseball’s “Growth” Problem:  Can Congress Require Major League 
Baseball to Test Its Athletes for Human Growth Hormone?  A Proposal, 62 ARK. L. REV. 315, 333 
n.126 (2009).  But see Selig Eyeing HGH Test in Minors, ESPN.COM (Feb. 24, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4938135 (following the suspension of a British rugby 
player who tested positive for HGH, MLB announced its plan to test its minor league players for HGH 
in 2010—a similar move to testing minor leaguers for steroids prior to the 2003 Survey Testing).  The 
testing began on a limited basis in July 2010.  See Minor Leaguers to Be Tested for HGH, ESPN.COM
(July 23, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=5402071.
Moreover, legal nutritional supplements could have triggered an 
61. It is clear from the media leaks themselves and the publishing of what is considered a fake list 
of positive test results that there is a strong demand for full disclosure of the test results.  See infra note 
73 and accompanying text (discussing media leaks); infra note 71 (discussing fake list).
62. See Michael S. Schmidt, Stars of Red Sox Title Years Are Linked to Doping, N.Y. TIMES, July 
31, 2009, at A1.
63. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
64. CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2008); Michael S. Schmidt, Drug Test Results from 
2003 Could Soon Be in Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A2 (noting that it is unknown why the 
Players Association did not have the test results immediately destroyed, which was within their right 
under the 2002 testing agreement).  The union did contest a handful of the positive results, but the five 
to seven percent threshold would have been met anyway. See MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 55 n.163.  
According to the Mitchell Report, ninety-six of 1,369 results, or 7.01%, were positive for steroids.  Id.
Subtracting the thirteen disputed results would yield 6.06% (83/1,369), which still meets the five to 
seven percent threshold.
65. See Schmidt, supra note 62, at A1.
66. Id.  Hereinafter, this government list of 104 positive results shall be referred to as the “List.”
67. Curry & Longman, supra note 45.
68. MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 55 n.163.
69. Barry M. Bloom, MLB, Union Cast Doubt on List of Names, MLB.COM (Aug. 8, 2009), 
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initial positive result.70 As a result, both MLB and the MLBPA released statements 
cautioning the media and the general public against drawing conclusions based 
solely on the names contained on the List.71
Despite reasons to doubt the legitimacy of the List, there has been substantial 
speculation about the names that appear on it.72 Moreover, since the existence of a 
list became public knowledge, four names have been leaked to the media by 
unknown sources: Alex Rodriguez, Sammy Sosa, Manny Ramirez and David 
Ortiz.73 It is also public knowledge that both Jason Grimsley and David Segui 
appear on the List.74
Neither MLB nor the Players Association anticipated the creation of any list 
whatsoever when negotiating the 2003 Survey Testing.75 Although the Ninth 
Circuit has held the seizure of the 2003 Survey Testing results unlawful, this ruling 
came too late for the four players mentioned above.76 Moreover, whoever leaked 
their names presumably has seen or has access to the rest of the List.  Even though 
the players will not face questioning by the government, they still face future 
threats to their privacy.77
II.  FROM DUMPSTER TO DICTA: THE BALCO INVESTIGATION
When federal agents raided BALCO in September 2003, it was not the 
government’s first interaction with the laboratory.78 BALCO was also no secret to 




was not until 2003 that the lab, its founder, Victor Conte, and a personal trainer 
named Greg Anderson became forever associated with baseball’s drug 
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. For example, a fantasy sports website briefly gained notoriety for publishing a list of 103 
names, widely denounced as a hoax.  See 2003 Steroid List Another Hoax?  Rotoinfo Publishes 
“Unconfirmed” List, BASEBALL’S STEROID ERA (June 30, 2009), http://thesteroidera.blogspot.com/
2009/06/2003-steroid-list-hoax.html.
73. Selena Roberts & David Epstein, Sources Tell SI Alex Rodriguez Tested Positive for Steroids 
in 2003, SI.COM (Feb. 7, 2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/baseball/mlb/02/07/alex-
rodriguez-steroids; Schmidt, supra note 62, at A1; Michael S. Schmidt, Sosa Is Said to Have Tested 
Positive in 2003, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2009, at B11.
74. Appeals Court Could Rehear Case, ESPN.COM, (Nov. 9, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/
mlb/news/story?id=4639482; Report:  Feds Wanted Grimsley to Help Implicate Bonds, ESPN.COM,
(June 9, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2474291; see also 2003 Steroid List 
Another Hoax?, supra note 72 (noting that in a tell all book about steroids in baseball, former clubhouse 
attendant Kirk Radomski mentions that Larry Bigbie also appears on the List).
75. This is evident from the fact that the testing was anonymous.  See Schmidt, supra note 62.
76. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
77. See Schmidt, supra note 62.
78. In 1999, Bill Romanowski, star linebacker for the Denver Broncos, was under investigation 
for prescription drug fraud.  Fainaru-Wada & Williams, supra note 11.  In the course of that 
investigation, Romanowski’s wife allegedly revealed that her husband obtained HGH from BALCO.  Id.
No prosecutions stemmed from that revelation.  Id.
79. See id.
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controversy.80
Section A of this Part describes the events that led to the raid on BALCO.  
Section B examines how the 2003 Survey Testing results became comingled with 
the BALCO investigation.  Section C traces the fate of the test results through the 
federal courts.
A. ORIGINS OF THE BALCO INVESTIGATION
The unveiling of BALCO to the general public originated with an anonymous 
phone call to the United States Anti-Doping Agency and the actions of an 
overzealous federal agent.81 In June 2003, a tipster, describing himself as a “high-
profile track and field coach,” claimed to have evidence that Victor Conte was 
distributing an undetectable steroid to athletes.82 The agency received the evidence 
the next day, and soon after was able to reverse engineer the substance—a steroid 
“altered slightly to avoid detection.”83 The agency developed a test for the drug, 
and retested hundreds of urine samples from athletes inside and outside track and 
field.84 Five track and field competitors and four Oakland Raiders tested positive 
for THG.85
Without more, the government had little evidence on which to proceed.  It did, 
however, have a federal agent based out of San Jose who worked out at the same 
gym as Barry Bonds (a BALCO client) located just around the corner from 
BALCO.86 Jeff Novitzky, an IRS Special Agent, had already initiated a sting 
operation in April 2003 aimed at uncovering a steroid ring in the Bay Area.87
Novitzky himself performed the most fruitful endeavor of the sting, spending night 
after night scouring through a green dumpster located in the alley behind BALCO’s 
offices.88 His midnight “dumpster diving” soon yielded enough evidence to secure 
a search warrant for BALCO’s premises.89
80. See id.; see also infra Part II.A.
81. See infra Part IV.A.2 (describing the questionable motives and tactics of IRS Special Agent 
Jeff Novitzky).
82. See Fainaru-Wada & Williams, supra note 11.  The tipster was later identified as Trevor 
Graham, former coach of Marion Jones, the now disgraced Olympic sprinter.  Jon Pessah, Over the 
Line?  Critics Conflicted on Steroids Crusader, ABC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/
Sports/LegalCenter/Story?id=6968609&page=1.
83. Fainaru-Wada & Williams, supra note 11.  The substance was named tetrahydrogestrinone 
(“THG”), but it is more commonly known as “the clear.”  Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Pessah, supra note 82.
87. Jonathan Littman, Gunning for the Big Guy, PLAYBOY, May 2004, at 66–70, 78, 142–45.  The 
operation, initiated by Novitzky largely in an effort to implicate Barry Bonds, involved one state 
narcotics agent going undercover as a body builder, a court ordered tap on Conte’s email account and 
consistent monitoring of Greg Anderson’s whereabouts.  Id.
88. Littman, supra note 87; see Pessah, supra note 82 (noting that Novitzky found enough 
evidence in BALCO’s garbage to convince his superiors to sign off on a warrant to search the lab).
89. See supra note 88.  Armed additionally with a subpoena for BALCO’s medical waste pickup, 
Novitzky obtained Fed Ex receipts addressed to “colorful pseudonyms,” various samples of PEDs and a 
conspicuous blood test labeled “B. BONDS” that was supposedly mislabeled.  Littman, supra note 87.
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Federal agents executed that warrant on September 3, 2003.90 They seized 
samples of THG, a testosterone lotion known as “the cream” and other performance 
enhancing drugs, along with numerous files on athletes.91 One month later, a grand 
jury convened to hear testimony from athletes with connections to BALCO.92
B. THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Baseball’s drug test results were about to become intertwined with the BALCO 
investigation.
The government initially served MLB with a grand jury subpoena for drug 
testing results of eleven players with connections to BALCO.93 Upon learning that 
MLB did not have this information, the government served CDT, which held the 
results, and Quest, which held the urine samples, with subpoenas seeking drug test 
information for all MLB players.94 Both CDT and Quest resisted production of the 
subpoenaed materials.95 In response, the government issued new subpoenas to the 
labs requesting information related to the BALCO players only.96 Despite knowing 
that the MLBPA just filed a motion to quash the latest round of subpoenas, the 
government obtained warrants to search CDT’s Long Beach, California office and 
Quest’s Las Vegas laboratory.97 The magistrate judge who issued the warrant to 
search CDT was unaware of the pending motion to quash.98 Moreover, the 
affidavit supporting the warrant purported “to ensure that samples of individuals 
not associated with BALCO are left undisturbed.”99 On April 8, 2004, federal 
agents executed both warrants.100
A group of twelve agents, led by Jeff Novitzky, entered CDT’s Long Beach 
office, where they located a hard copy document with names and identifying 
numbers for all MLB players.101 Novitzky faxed this document to Assistant United 
States Attorney Jeff Nedrow, the lead prosecutor, for preparation of a third search 
warrant to seize samples at Quest.102
90. Id.
  Shortly thereafter, a CDT director handed 
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008).  This number was later reduced to ten, as the 
government decided not to seek drug testing evidence against one of the eleven players.  Id. at 1090 n.7.  
The identity of the ten players (hereinafter the “BALCO players”) has not been publicly disclosed.  
However, it is fairly certain that Barry Bonds is one of the ten.  See Pessah, supra note 82 (noting that 
Novizky sent one of Bonds’s urine samples for further testing—an unnecessary step if Bonds was not 
part of the BALCO investigation).
94. Id. at 1090, 1118 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  CDT was later 
notified that the subpoenas would be withdrawn, but that action was never taken.  Id. at 1121.
95. Id. at 1090 (majority opinion).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1091; see also id. at 1119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 1119 n.1.  The government incorrectly asserted that Magistrate Judge Johnson did know 
about the pending motion to quash.  Id.
99. Id. at 1121.
100. Id. at 1092–93 (majority opinion).
101. Id. at 1092.
102. Id.  The samples at Quest did not list the players by name, instead using a numerical 
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agents a document containing the drug test results for the ten BALCO players.103
Not satisfied, Novitzky demanded to search CDT’s computer system.104 A CDT 
director reluctantly pointed him to a computer directory containing the files related 
to sports drug testing.105 The agents copied the directory, now known as the 
Tracey Directory, and brought the copy back to their offices for further review.106
Another group of federal agents simultaneously entered Quest’s facility in Las 
Vegas.107 Once in possession of the third search warrant, agents seized the 
BALCO players’ specimens.108 At the end of the day, the government had the
results and samples for the ten BALCO players.  Additionally, the government had 
the drug testing records for all of Major League Baseball, thirteen other sports 
organizations, three unrelated sporting competitions, and a nonsports business 
entity—information with the unfortunate fate of having been stored in the same 
directory as the targeted results.109
C. ADJUDICATION
The government quickly realized what it had uncovered.110 Intermingled with 
the drug test results for the ten BALCO players were the names of all MLB players 
who tested positive under the 2003 Survey Testing.111 A flurry of court filings 
ensued, ultimately leading to protracted litigation over whether the government 
could retain the results of the non-BALCO players.112
1.  District Court Rulings
Subsection C.1 summarizes 
the procedural history across the three districts.  Subsection C.2 then discusses the 
consolidated appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
113
As a follow-up to its initial search of CDT and Quest, the government obtained 
seven search warrants across three districts within less than one month’s time.114
identifier.  Id. at 1093.  This hard copy document was necessary to determine which samples at Quest to 
seize.  Id. The government sought the actual urine samples presumably to retest them.  See Pessah, 
supra note 82 (noting that Novitzky sent one of Bonds’ urine samples for retesting).  But see Littman, 
supra note 87 (noting that MLB did not retest any of its samples for THG).
It 
103. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1092.
104. Pessah, supra note 82.
105. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1092.
106. Id. at 1092–93.
107. Id. at 1093.
108. Id.
109. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010).
110. See Pessah, supra note 82 (“Instead, Novitzky . . . reviewed the [seized] material and saw that 
he’d cornered the game’s best player, Alex Rodriguez.  He quickly asked his grand jury for and received 
a subpoena for the records of the 104 players who tested positive.”).
111. See CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1177.
112. See infra Parts II.C.1–2.
113. See infra Appendix for a complete procedural history by district.
114. CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (majority opinion) (initial warrants issued on 
April 7, 2004 to search CDT and Quest); id. at 1093 (third warrant issued on April 8, 2004 to seize 
specimen samples from Quest); id. at 1092 n.15 (fourth warrant issued on April 8, 2004 to search CDT’s 
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also served three grand jury subpoenas each to CDT and Quest between January 
and May 2004.115 This activity resulted in at least two motions to quash grand jury 
subpoenas and at least four Rule 41(g) motions for the return of property 
improperly seized by the government.116
All three district courts that ruled on these motions granted them in favor of the 
movant, the MLBPA.  In the Northern District of California, Judge Susan Illston
granted its Rule 41(g) motion (the “Illston Order”).117 Judge Illston also granted 
the MLBPA’s motion to quash grand jury subpoenas requesting materials that were 
the subject of previous warrants, (the “Illston Quashal”).118 In the Central District 
of California, Judge Florence-Marie Cooper granted the MLBPA’s Rule 41(g) 
motion (the “Cooper Order”).119 Finally, in the District of Nevada, Judge James 
Mahan granted the MLBPA’s Rule 41(g) motion (the “Mahan Order”).120 The 
government did not appeal the Illston Order, but appealed the other three rulings.121
The Illston Quashal, the Cooper Order and the Mahan Order were consolidated into 
one appeal before the Ninth Circuit.122
2.  Ninth Circuit Decisions
Oral argument for the consolidated appeal took place on November 15, 2005 
before a three member panel comprised of Judges Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Sidney 
Thomas and Richard Tallman.123 The three judge panel filed its original opinion 
and dissent on December 27, 2006.124 This opinion was subsequently withdrawn 
and superseded by an opinion and dissent filed on January 24, 2008.125 The panel 
dismissed the government’s appeal of the Cooper Order as untimely and affirmed 
Judge Cooper’s order denying its motion for reconsideration.126 However, a 
divided panel reversed the Mahan Order and the Illston Quashal.127
storage locker); id. at 1093 n.20 (fifth search warrant issued on April 30, 2004 to seize electronic data it 
already had); id. at 1094 (sixth and seventh search warrants issued on May 5, 2004 to seize specimens 
and records related to positive test results).
In doing so, it 
held that the government’s seizure of intermingled evidence for off site review was 
lawful and the issuance of subpoenas and contemporaneous execution of search 
115. See id. at 1121–22 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. See id. at 1090–91, 1095 (majority opinion) (motions to quash); id. at 1094; id. at 1121, 1123 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Rule 41(g) motions).  Under Rule 41(g), a person 
subject to an unlawful search and seizure can file a motion for return of that property.  FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(g).  Hereinafter, this motion is referred to as a “Rule 41(g) motion.”
117. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010).
118. Id. at 1167.
119. Id. at 1166.
120. Id. at 1166–67.
121. Id. at 1167, 1170.
122. Id. at 1162.
123. CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008).
124. Id. at 1089.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1101, 1102.
127. See id. at 1103–15.
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warrants was not unreasonable.128 The three judge panel’s final decision was two 
to one in favor of the government.129
CDT and the MLBPA filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which was granted 
on September 30, 2008.130  Oral argument took place on December 18, 2008.131
On August 26, 2009, the en banc panel filed its opinion, written by Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski, consisting of two partial concurrences and partial dissents and a 
dissent.132 The en banc panel adopted CDT I’s analysis of the Cooper Order and 
dismissed the government’s appeal of that order.133 It further held that the Cooper 
Order and Illston Order have preclusive effect on the government’s appeal of the 
Mahan Order.134 In upholding the Mahan Order, the en banc panel also dismissed 
the government’s contrary arguments regarding the “plain view” doctrine, the 
warrant protocol and the appropriateness of the Rule 41(g) motions.135 Finally, the 
en banc panel upheld the Illston Quashal on the grounds that Judge Illston did not 
abuse her discretion in quashing the government’s grand jury subpoena.136 In sum, 
the en banc panel ruled that the government’s seizure was unlawful.137  It voted 
nine to two in favor of CDT and the MLBPA.138
The panel opinion did not stop at a resolution of the consolidated appeals, 
however.  Embedded in the en banc panel’s discussion of the Mahan Order and the 
Illston Quashal, and then reiterated in its “Concluding Thoughts,” was dicta in the 
form of five points of procedural guidance that magistrate judges should follow 
when dealing with searches and seizures involving electronic data (“the Dicta”).139
The case received scant attention in the legal community, but was not ignored by 
the government.140
128. Id. at 1110–11, 1114.
Pursuant to an order by Chief Judge Kozinski, both the 
government and the appellees, the MLBPA and CDT, submitted briefs addressing 
129. Id. at 1089.
130. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 545 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008).  Due to its 
large size, the Ninth Circuit has a unique approach to the en banc court.  See Appeals Court Could 
Rehear Case, supra note 74.  Rather than convene a panel of twenty-seven judges, the court provides for 
limited en banc review by a randomly selected eleven judge panel.  Id.; 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.  There is a 
procedure for a full en banc panel, but this has yet to be invoked since the court adopted the limited 
panels in 1980.  Appeals Court Could Rehear Case, supra note 74.
131. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 994.
134. Id. at 997.
135. Id. at 997–1003.
136. Id. at 1003–04.
137. Id. at 1000–03.
138. Id. at 992–93.
139. Id. at 998–99, 1004, 1006–07; see also id. at 1012–13 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[The majority’s] protocols are dicta and might be best viewed as a ‘best practices’ 
manual, rather than binding law.”).  Hereinafter, this guidance is sometimes referred to as the “Dicta.”
140. Shane Harris, Cuffing Digital Detectives, NAT’L J. MAG. (Dec. 19, 2009), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/id_20091219_3389.php.  But see Christine Mumford & 
Hugh Kaplan, Electronic Discovery:  Attorneys, Academics Sort Through Landmark Case on Computer 
Searches, 14 Elec. Com. L. Rep. (BNA) 1284 (2009).
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whether the case should be reheard by the full court.141  The government’s brief 
heavily opposed the Dicta and called for withdrawal of the en banc opinion.142 The 
appellees’ brief expressed no opinion on the Dicta and urged the court to leave its 
decision undisturbed.143
On September 13, 2010, the Ninth Circuit issued its final opinion on the case.144
The majority opinion has been relabeled as per curiam but in fact consists only of 
the original opinion minus the Dicta.145 Chief Judge Kozinski is now the author of 
a separate concurrence, joined by four other judges, which includes the Dicta and is 
not Ninth Circuit law.146
III.  ANALYSIS
While this case has been resolved in the players’ favor, the Ninth Circuit 
decision cannot erase over seven years of anxiety stemming from this unlawful 
seizure.147 Moreover, four players in particular have suffered additional violations 
of their common law privacy rights.148
Section A of this Part first addresses the common law privacy rights of 
professional athletes generally before analyzing the violation of those rights due to 
disclosure of the confidential test results to the media.  Section B then explores how 
the players’ fourth amendment rights, which embody a constitutional right to 
privacy, are implicated by the unreasonable seizure of their test results.  Finally, 
Section C examines the outcome of CDT III and the tension between law 
enforcement objectives and individual privacy rights that pervades the Ninth 
Circuit decision.
141. Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court, CDT II, 579 
F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009), (Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354) [hereinafter Government’s Brief]; 
Appellees’ Brief Re Rehearing by the Full Court, CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, (Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-
55354) [hereinafter Appellees’ Brief]; Appeals Court Could Rehear Case, supra note 74.
142. Government’s Brief, supra note 141.
143. Appellees’ Brief, supra note 141, at 1–2.  The brief provides:
Appellees take no position, however, and instead leave to the Court’s sound discretion, whether
the full Court or the en banc panel should review or clarify the en banc decision’s forward-
looking guidelines for searches of electronic records.  Those guidelines are unnecessary to the 
resolution of the issues presented in this case.
Id.
144. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162 1165 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The revised opinion filed concurrently 
herewith [this order] shall constitute the final action of the court.  No petitions for rehearing will be 
considered.”).
145. Compare id. with CDT II, 579 F.3d 989.
146. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178, (Kozinski, C.J., concurring); id. at 1183 (Callahan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“The concurrence is not joined by a majority of the en banc panel and 
accordingly the suggested guidelines are not Ninth Circuit law.”).
147. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1177–78; see also List of Positive Tests Barred from Courts, ESPN.COM
(Dec. 10, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=5907927 (noting the government will not 
appeal to the Supreme Court).
148. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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A. PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES’ RIGHT TO PRIVACY
As a legal right, privacy is grounded in common law and the Constitution.  The 
common law right protects against intrusions by private parties (often involving the 
media), while the constitutional right protects against intrusions by the 
government.149
1.  Common Law Right to Privacy
This Section focuses on the common law right.  The constitutional 
right is taken up in Section B.
The common law right to privacy is, essentially, the right to be left alone, the 
invasion of which is a tort.150 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first introduced 
this concept in their famous Harvard Law Review article entitled “The Right to 
Privacy.”151 William Prosser, the renowned tort expert, categorized the violation of 
the right as potentially comprising four separate torts: 1) unreasonable intrusion 
upon seclusion; 2) appropriation of another’s identity for one’s benefit; 3) public 
disclosure of private facts about another; and 4) placing another in a false light in 
the public eye.152 Today, an overwhelming majority of courts recognize this 
common law right.153
Certain persons have a diminished expectation of privacy, particularly with 
regard to the third tort, public disclosure of private facts.  A person who, by his or 
her own activities or by force of circumstances, becomes a public personage 
thereby relinquishes a part of the right of privacy “to the extent that the public has a 
legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, or character.”154 The clearest examples of 
public figures are politicians, actors and actresses and professional athletes.155
Professional athletes have long been considered public figures.156 However, the 
level of media attention and scrutiny they currently receive is a much more recent 
phenomenon.157
149. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).
Professional athletes have achieved considerable notoriety, which 
150. See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
151. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
152. Prosser, supra note 150, at 389.  Today, most courts that recognize this right adhere to these 
four forms.  See C.J.S. Right of Privacy and Publicity § 4 (2009).
153. 44 N.Y. JUR. 2D DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY § 288 (2009). Only a few states, including New 
York, Virginia, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Wisconsin and Nebraska, deny the existence of this right.  Id.;
see also 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 4 n.1 (2009).
154. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 117 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), disapproved of 
on other grounds by Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
155. See Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Ct. App. 1962) (naming actors 
and actresses, professional athletes and public officers as those who “have to some extent lost the right 
of privacy . . . .”).  Government officials and candidates for public office have a much lower expectation 
of privacy than actors, actresses and professional athletes.  Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922–23. In addition, 
there is a distinction between public figures and public officials—public figures include public officials, 
see infra note 160, but the reverse is not true.  See Damiano v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 485, 
491–92 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting that Bob Dylan, the famous American singer/songwriter, is a public figure 
but not a public official).
156. See Carlisle, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
157. For instance, Michael Jordan, who played most of his career during the 1990s, never lost a 
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has translated into commercial opportunities outside of their athletic careers.  For 
example, professional athletes star in movies, perform on record albums and 
headline advertising campaigns.158 Not surprisingly, they also fill the tabloids and 
gossip columns just like other celebrities.159
Public figures face a considerably high bar when asserting that their privacy has 
been violated.  The public’s legitimate interest has always been interpreted 
broadly.160  Together with constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of 
the press, this broad interpretation amounts to substantial protection of the media’s 
publication of information regarding public figures.  In addition, the media has a 
qualified reporter’s privilege, allowing a journalist to withhold sources or 
information received in confidence.161
sponsorship despite a well known gambling problem and an adulterous relationship.  Apryl Duncan, 
Celebrity Endorsement Deals Gone Astray, ABOUT.COM,
http://advertising.about.com/od/celebrityendorsements/a/celebendorse.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).  
By contrast, Kobe Bryant almost immediately lost his sponsorship with Nutella when sexual assault 
allegations arose against him in the summer of 2003.  Davide Dukcevich, Nutella to End Kobe Bryant 
Sponsorship; Saban Bids for ProSieben, Again, FORBES.COM (Aug. 4, 2003),
http://www.forbes.com/2003/08/04/cx_dd_0804faces.html.  Finally, as of this writing, Tiger Woods has 
lost sponsorships with AT&T, Accenture and Gatorade since his infidelity became public in December 
2009.  Darren Rovell, CNBC:  Tiger Woods’ Lost Endorsements Cost IMG $4.6M, U.S.A. TODAY (June 
21, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2010-06-20-endorsements-tiger_N.htm.
That privilege is qualified in the context of 
158. Selected examples of athletes appearing in movies include Michael Jordan in SPACE JAM
(Warner Bros. Pictures 1996), Shaquille O’Neal in BLUE CHIPS (Paramount Pictures 1994) and Dennis 
Rodman in DOUBLE TEAM (Mandalay Entertainment 1997).  IMDB, http://www.imdb.com (search 
“Michael Jeffrey Jordan”; “Shaquille Rashaun O’Neal”; “Dennis Keith Rodman”) (last visited Feb. 18, 
2011).
In addition, Bernie Williams, a former New York Yankee, has recorded two albums, the latter 
of which was recently nominated for a Latin Grammy award.  2009 Nominees, THE LATIN RECORDING 
ACADEMY, http://www.latingrammy.com/en/nominees/16-instrumental (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).  
Wayman Tisdale, a former NBA player, recorded eight jazz albums during his lifetime.  Former Sooners 
Great, NBA Player Tisdale Dies After Battle With Cancer, CBSSPORTS.COM (May 15, 2009),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/story/11749960.
As for advertising campaigns, Nike’s Air Jordan, the signature shoe created for Michael 
Jordan, remains popular today despite the fact that Jordan has been retired since 2003.  Jordan Brand 
History, SNEAKERHEAD.COM, http://www.sneakerhead.com/jordan-brand-history.html (last visited Feb. 
2, 2011).  Until recently, Accenture’s ad campaign was built almost entirely around Tiger Woods.  
Accenture Cuts Woods as Sponsor, ESPN.COM, (Dec. 14, 2009) http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/
news/story?id=4739219.
159. The homepage for TMZ.com, the popular celebrity gossip website, listed Tiger Woods as one 
of three names under “Hot Searches” over one month after news of his repeated infidelity broke (the 
other two names are of recently deceased female celebrities).  TMZ.COM, http://www.tmz.com (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2010).
160. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).  As Circuit Judge Clark 
wrote:
[W]hen focused upon public characters, truthful comments upon dress, speech, habits, and the 
ordinary aspects of personality will usually not transgress [the community’s notions of decency]. 
Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and ‘public figures’ are subjects of 
considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the population.  And when such are the mores 
of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in the newspapers, 
books, and magazines of the day.
Id.
161. In Branzburg v. Hayes, a plurality of the Supreme Court declined to grant journalists a 
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litigation, where the court must strike a balance between the reporter’s privilege 
and a litigant’s right to the information sought.162 Aside from this qualification, the 
media can generally publish any truthful information about a public figure that they 
legally obtain.163
The privacy analysis changes once issues of confidentiality arise.  The 
temptation certainly exists for those privy to confidential information about public 
figures, which has tremendous value to the media, to leak that information.
Professional athletes, therefore, seldom have a remedy in tort for 
invasions of privacy by private actors.
164 In 
spite of their status as public figures, however, professional athletes are private 
citizens whose confidential information is protected from public disclosure.165
Should such disclosure nonetheless occur, the media are generally not liable for 
its publication.
They have an expectation of privacy regarding certain private facts, particularly 
those to be kept confidential pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
166 Athletes should instead seek their remedy from the source of the 
disclosure.167 When that source is the government, their course of action should be 
the same.168 Unfortunately, it does not appear that Congress or any state has 
provided such a remedy against itself or its officials.169 A private right of action 
against the government may not be available if it has not explicitly provided for 
one.170
testimonial privilege grounded in the First Amendment.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690–91 
(1972) (holding that journalists cannot refuse to answer relevant and material questions asked during a 
good faith grand jury investigation).  However, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, which calls for the 
recognition of privilege on a case by case basis has been interpreted by lower courts to signify the 
existence of the reporter’s privilege.  Id. at 710; see Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 
1979); RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas:  Impact, Perception, and Legal Protection in the 
Changing World of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317, 344–45 (2009) (citations omitted).
Most states also have some sort of reporter’s shield law. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2(b).  The 
California shield law is not a privilege, but provides immunity from being adjudged in contempt for 
refusal to disclose either unprivileged information or the source of information.  Delaney v. Superior 
Court, 789 P.2d 934, 939 (Cal. 1990).  This protection is “overcome only by a countervailing federal 
constitutional right.”  Miller v. Superior Court, 986 P.2d 170, 179 (Cal. 1999).
Until legislatures create this remedy statutorily, professional athletes have 
162. Riley provides a balancing test used for this purpose.  Riley, 612 F.2d at 716.  This test applies 
to both civil and criminal actions.  See, e.g., Damiano v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 485, 496 
(D.N.J. 1996) (civil action); United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 357 (3d Cir. 1980) (criminal action).
163. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); see also G. Michael Harvey, 
Confidentiality:  A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2389–90 
(1992) (noting that both private and public figures fare poorly in private facts tort litigation).
164. See, e.g., Damiano, 168 F.R.D. at 492 (noting the strong possibility that raw discovery 
materials would be used for financial profit).
165. See id. at 493 (granting motion to designate as confidential deposition transcripts and 
discovery materials pertaining to Bob Dylan).
166. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541; Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 
1991).
167. See Reuber, 925 F.2d at 720 (“Such a suit compensates the injured plaintiff and encourages 
employers to maintain the confidentiality of their files.”).
168. Cf. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534.
169. See infra Part IV.B.2.
170. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 688 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395–96 (Ct. Cl. 1999) (finding that private 
right of action could not be implied under personal privacy protection laws where state legislature 
addressed civil remedies and did not create this right nor suggest one was intended).
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little protection against public disclosure of confidential private facts.  As a result 
of the BALCO investigation, this type of disclosure has begun to occur.171
2.  An Invasion of Privacy: Untraceable Media Leaks
The results of the 2003 Survey Testing in Major League Baseball were supposed 
to remain anonymous and confidential.172 The government was presumably aware 
of this fact, as its affidavit supporting the initial warrant to search BALCO 
purported “to ensure that samples of individuals not associated with Balco are left 
undisturbed.”173 Yet the government attempted to justify seizure of all positive 
results and planned to use them to further its investigation.174
Prior to the seizure of the Tracey Directory in April 2004, the public knew only 
that the number of positive results had triggered the five to seven percent threshold 
required for implementation of a mandatory random testing program.175 CDT and 
Quest had the results and samples in their possession since at least November 2003, 
and no disclosure of any kind had occurred.176 In May 2004, MLB and the 
MLBPA agreed to move the drug testing program to the World Anti-Doping 
Agency (“WADA”) lab in Montreal, Canada.177 The 2004 testing, which provided 
anonymous treatment for a first time offender, yielded twelve undisputed positive 
results for steroids.178  None of these results have been publicly disclosed, 
consistent with the drug testing program in place that year.179
In fact, the public knew very little about the contents of the List until fairly 
recently.  In June 2006, Jason Grimsley became the first player revealed to be on 
the List.180  This revelation was his own, part of his cooperation with a criminal 
investigation into his purchase of HGH.181 In December 2007, David Segui 
became the second, also by way of his own admission.182
171. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
While both players 
172. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010).
173. CDT I, 513 F.3d, 1085, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). (Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1170–71 (using the “plain view” doctrine, to be discussed in Part III.B);
see Schmidt, supra note 64.
175. See Curry & Longman, supra note 45.
176. See id. (providing that MLB announced the results of the Survey Testing in November 2003).
177. Barry M. Bloom, MLB, Union Agree to Move Testing, MLB.COM (May 11, 2004), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20040511&content_id=740972&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp
&c_id=mlb.
178. Bloom, supra note 48; MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 55.
179. Barry M. Bloom, Mandatory Steroid Testing to Begin, MLB.COM (Nov. 13, 2003), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20031113&content_id=603458&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp
&c_id=mlb.
180. Report:  Feds Wanted Grimsley to Help Implicate Bonds, supra note 74.
181. See id. (providing that in an affidavit, Grimsley admitted that he failed a steroid test in 2003).
182. Report:  Segui Admits Steroid Use, MLB.COM (Dec. 10, 2007), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/
article.jsp?ymd=20071211&content_id=2322662&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb (noting that 
Segui admitted to purchasing steroids from Kirk Radomski).  The Mitchell Report revealed that an 
anonymous player was told by then MLBPA Chief Operating Officer Gene Orza that he tested positive 
under the 2003 Survey Testing.  MITCHELL, supra note 42, at 282.  In Radomski’s tell all book, he wrote 
the following about that revelation:  “I knew that Senator Mitchell was quoting David Segui (about the 
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enjoyed long careers, neither player had the kind of career that would merit 
consideration for baseball’s Hall of Fame.183
In 2009, media reports cited four of baseball’s most accomplished players as 
having tested positive for steroids in the 2003 Survey Testing.
  Not surprisingly, public interest in 
these revelations was underwhelming compared to what soon unfolded.
184 Alex Rodriguez, 
the three-time American League MVP who previously denounced drug use in 
Major League Baseball, was forced to admit that he took steroids during the 2001 
to 2003 seasons.185 Sammy Sosa, the 1998 National League MVP who currently 
ranks sixth on baseball’s all-time home run list, declined comment after the New 
York Times reported his positive test.186 Manny Ramirez, the 2004 World Series 
MVP who had recently served a fifty game suspension for PED use, also declined 
comment after a similar New York Times report surfaced in July 2009.187 Finally, 
David Ortiz, the 2004 American League Championship Series MVP, was named in 
the same report as Ramirez.188 Ortiz, however, was determined to clear his 
name.189
Shortly after the New York Times story broke, Ortiz and MLBPA general 
counsel Michael Weiner appeared together in a press conference.190 Ortiz admitted 
to being “a little bit careless back in those days when I was buying supplements and 
vitamins over the counter—legal supplements, legal vitamins over the counter—but 
I never buy [sic] steroids or use steroids.”191 Ortiz also mentioned that, in a 2004 
meeting with Weiner, he was not told that he tested positive.192
2003 positive test) because David had told me exactly the same thing.”  KIRK RADOMSKI, BASES 
LOADED: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STEROID ERA IN BASEBALL BY THE CENTRAL FIGURE IN THE 
MITCHELL REPORT 232 (2009).  Segui’s revelation in December 2007 corroborates Radomski’s claim. 
Report:  Segui Admits Steroid Use, supra.
Weiner noted that 
the union could not provide any additional information to Ortiz other than to 
183. Both Jason Grimsley and David Segui played at the Major League level for fifteen seasons, 
but neither player, based on Baseball-Reference’s metrics, has a chance of being elected to the Hall of 
Fame.  Jason Grimsley, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/g/
grimsja01.shtml  (last visited Feb 23, 2011); David Segui, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM,
http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/s/seguida01.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
184. See supra notes 73 and accompanying text.
185. Schwarz, supra note 1 (quoting Rodriguez on drug abuse in the 1980s:  “As a fan, you don't 
want to believe it.  It's surreal.  My hero was Keith Hernandez.  If you had said anything bad about Keith 
I would call you a liar.  It tarnished the purity of the game.”); A-Rod Admits, Regrets Use of PEDs,
ESPN.COM, Feb. 10, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3894847.
186. Schmidt, supra note 73.
187. Schmidt, supra note 62.
188. Id.
189. After the story broke, Ortiz immediately issued the following statement:  “One, I have already 
contacted the players association to confirm if this report is true.  I have just been told that the report is 
true.  Based on the way I have lived my life, I am surprised to learn I tested positive.  Two, I will find 
out what I tested positive for.  And, three, based on whatever I learn, I will share this information with 
my club and the public.”  Id.
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confirm that he is on the List, because the List is currently under court seal.193
MLB and the MLBPA had issued statements one day earlier cautioning the public 
against drawing conclusions based solely on the names contained on the List.194
While Ortiz made his best attempt to dispute the implications of the news report, he 
may have suffered irreparable harm in the court of public opinion with little to no 
recourse in a court of law.195
Professional athletes derive tremendous value from their ability to keep a clean 
public image.196 A significant blow to one’s reputation can result in loss of 
endorsements or even loss of one’s job.197 Being labeled a cheater may also 
prevent an elite player from being honored in his or her sport’s hall of fame.198
This honor brings with it prestige and also may spur a renewed interest in that 
player’s career, increasing the value of his autograph and paid appearances.  Mark 
McGwire and Sammy Sosa, the two players most often credited with the 
resurgence in baseball’s popularity in the mid 1990s, are illustrative examples.199
It is widely believed that Mark McGwire will never be voted into MLB’s Hall of 
Fame due to his now admitted steroid use.200 Since his retirement in 2001, 
McGwire has kept a low profile (aside from one famous appearance before the 
House Committee on Government Reform) and generally avoided the media.201
Tony La Russa, current manager for the St. Louis Cardinals and McGwire’s 
manager for virtually all of his playing career, finally convinced him to return to 
baseball as the team’s hitting coach for the 2010 season.202
193. Id. Due to the significant number of positive results that have been disputed, it is possible to 
be on the List and ultimately not test positive.  See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
La Russa has even said 
194. Bloom, supra note 69.
195. See, e.g., Howard Bryant, Faith Unrewarded, ESPN.COM (Aug. 9, 2009),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=bryant_howard&id=4366974 (“Barring a 
spectacular, unprecedented exoneration, Ortiz will have lost the bank of goodwill and trust he spent 
years accruing.”).
196. See infra note 197.
197. See, e.g., supra note 157.  Barry Bonds remained unsigned following the 2007 season in 
which he broke baseball’s all-time home run record.  Buster Olney, Players Like Bonds, Gibbons, Logan 
Struggle to Find Work, ESPN.COM (June 11, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/
story?id=3437067 (noting also that Jay Gibbons and Nook Logan have not been offered contracts 
following their inclusion in the Mitchell Report).  It has been suggested that teams colluded against 
Bonds in an effort to keep him out of baseball. Sniffing for Collusion, Fehr Wonders Why Bonds Is 
Unwanted, CBSSPORTS.COM (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/
story/10719589/rss.
198. See, e.g., infra note 200.
199. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 6.
200. Josh Hargreaves, Mark McGwire Doping Admission May Not Help Hall of Fame Shot,
REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60C07N20100113; see also Jack 
Curry, 2 Stars Leap to Hall of Fame, but Steriod Cloud Stops 3rd, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at D1 
(providing perspective immediately after his first unsuccessful bid in 2007).
201. See Wilson, supra note 6; see, e.g., McGwire Apologizes to La Russa, Selig, supra note 29.  
McGwire’s post-retirement actions are ironic because he was previously regarded as a “media darling” 
during his playing days.  Harry Stein, Writers Scrutinize Big Mac and Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2007, at D2.
202. Mark McGwire Returns to Cardinals as Coach, CBSSPORTS.COM (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/26/sportsline/main5422129.shtml.
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that McGwire’s return can restore his tarnished reputation.203 It remains to be seen 
whether he can recoup his public image, but in the meantime, his return and 
subsequent admission of steroid use have generated plenty of controversy.204 On 
the other hand, Sammy Sosa has not reappeared in baseball since he last played in 
2007.205 In a June 2009 interview, Sosa said he planned to formally retire soon, 
stating, “I will calmly wait for my induction to the Baseball Hall of Fame.”206
However, only months prior to that interview, Sosa expressed hope that he would 
be offered a contract for the 2009 season.207
David Ortiz remains gainfully employed and his reputation was not completely 
tarnished by the revelation of his inclusion on the List.
Both McGwire and Sosa have 
experienced the fall from national icon to unemployment and rejection by the game 
they both love, all as a result of their connection to steroids.
208 Why Ortiz has avoided 
most of the negative consequences of a connection to PEDs is unclear, but his 
ability to do so raises the possibility that people believe he is telling the truth.  After 
all, legally available nutritional supplements could have triggered an initial positive 
test under the 2003 Survey Testing program.209 These supplements may have been 
tainted, as some professional athletes have tried to argue when confronted with a 
positive test result.210 While that argument may not help MLB players avoid 
suspension, it would certainly absolve them of guilt in the public eye if it were 
true.211
203. McGwire Apologizes to La Russa, Selig, supra note 29.
  To that end, at least one player has gone so far as to sue a supplement 
204. Mark McGwire Offers Steroid Apology, ESPN.COM (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4921052.  This Note does not suggest that McGwire 
returned to baseball purely for financial reasons and that he lacked adequate resources in the eight years 
following his retirement.  Instead, this Note merely points out that McGwire felt compelled to return to 
baseball and face scrutiny about his now admitted steroid use.  His ability to return to Major League 
Baseball clearly has value to him, both intrinsically and economically.
205. Yoel Adames, Sosa Reflects on MLB Career, ESPNDEPORTES.COM (June 4, 2009, 12:56 PM 
ET), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4229022 (mentioning also that Sosa now works for 
the Dominican government).
206. Id.
207. Sosa Still Waiting for Offer, ESPN.COM (Dec. 26, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/
news/story?id=3793001.
208. David Ortiz Returning to Red Sox, ESPN.COM (Nov. 4, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/
boston/mlb/news/story?id=5764146; Gordon Edes, No Place Like Boston for David Ortiz, ESPN.COM
(Sept. 7, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/mlb/columns/story?columnist=edes_gordon&id=
5541571 (“Ortiz’s image is not as pristine as [Derek] Jeter’s, not after he was linked to performance-
enhancing substances last year, but he remains an icon and a force in the community, one whose name 
has been linked to good far more than the opposite.”); Johnette Howard, All-Stars Realign for David 
Ortiz, ESPN.COM (July 7, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/commentary/news/story?id=5360860 
(arguing that Ortiz has not restored his reputation, but was nevertheless elected to the 2010 MLB All 
Star Game by vote of his fellow MLB players).
209. Bloom, supra note 69.
210. See, e.g., Chargers’ Merriman Apologizes, Will Appeal Suspension, ESPN.COM (Oct. 25, 
2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2636523 (Shawne Merriman’s lawyer blamed the 
positive result on a tainted supplement); Michael S. Schmidt, Reliever Who Helped Phillies to Title Is 
Suspended for Failed Drug Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at B16 (both J.C. Romero and Sergio Mitre 
blamed tainted nutritional supplements for their positive tests).
211. See Schmidt, supra note 210.
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company over his positive result.212 However, Ortiz and others on the List may not 
have this option.  Ortiz learned of his inclusion on the List six years after he 
allegedly tested positive.213 As Weiner stated in their joint press conference, “His 
reputation has been called into question.  He does not know specifically why.  And 
he can’t get the information that would allow him to offer a full explanation.”214
The remaining ninety-eight players whose names have not been publicly disclosed 
should soon find out about their inclusion on the List.215
As discussed at the end of the previous subsection, the players who have 
suffered or who may yet suffer from the effects of disclosure of their confidential 
test results have a very limited legal remedy.
If additional leaks occur, 
the players will be scrutinized about events that took place seven years ago.  By 
now, receipts, records and even memories may be long gone and of no use in 
clearing an accused athlete’s name.  Unfortunately, there is no statute of limitations 
in the court of public opinion.
216 They cannot sue the media, who 
are heavily protected by the First Amendment. They do, in most states, have a tort 
action available for public disclosure of private facts, as even professional athletes 
retain the right to keep their confidential information private.217 However, finding 
the source of that disclosure may prove to be an impossible task.  The media rarely 
gives up its sources, even to the point of serving jail time for contempt of court.218
Even when subpoenaed by a federal grand jury, where there is no common law or 
statutory shield law protection, reporters remain silent.219 Recently, for instance, 
the lawyer who leaked Barry Bonds’ grand jury testimony to the media admitted to 
doing so, saving two reporters from potential eighteen month jail sentences.220
This admission came months after a grand jury served the reporters with subpoenas 
to reveal their source.221 It is even less likely that reporters will divulge their 
sources in a civil litigation, where a reporter’s shield law may apply.222
212. Michael O’Keeffe & Nathaniel Vinton, Suspended Phillies Reliever J.C. Romero Suing 
Supplement Makers over Positive Steroid Test, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 27, 2009),
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/baseball/2009/04/27/2009-04-
27_suspended_phillies_reliever_jc_romero_su.html (asserting negligence, intentional misrepresentation 
and consumer fraud).
Such a law 
is part of the Constitution in California, where CDT III was heard and presumably 
213. See Ortiz Apologizes for ‘Distraction’, supra note 190.
214. Id.
215. As CDT III has been resolved in favor of CDT and the MLBPA, the 2003 Survey Testing 
results will be returned shortly.  At that point, it is likely that the MLBPA will inform each player of 
their inclusion on the List and what caused their positive test.  Cf. id. (providing that Ortiz was told he 
was on the List, but was not told whether he tested positive and what caused the positive result because 
the information was under court seal).
216. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 155 (noting the difference between public figures and public officials).
218. Jones, supra note 161, at 341–43.
219. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690–91 (1972).
220. Bob Egelko, Lawyer Admits Leaking BALCO Testimony, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 14, 
2007, at A1.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 2(b).
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where the leaks occurred.223
Furthermore, it is virtually certain that members of the government’s legal 
and/or investigative team(s) are responsible for the leaks.  The New York Times
reporter who broke the news of positive results for Sammy Sosa, Manny Ramirez 
and David Ortiz cited “lawyers with knowledge of the [drug-testing] results” as his 
source.
The task of subpoenaing the media to learn their 
source(s) is therefore more than likely to fail.  Without a sanctioned grand jury 
investigation into the leaks, there is no pressure for the culprit(s) to come forward.
224 A Sports Illustrated writer cited four sources—two with knowledge of 
the evidence gathered in the government’s investigation on steroid use in baseball 
and two with knowledge of the test results—in her story about Alex Rodriguez’s 
positive test.225 The story also mentions which substances triggered Rodriguez’s 
positive test.226 Only the government has access to that information.  The MLBPA 
may be able to confirm whether a player appears on the List, but has no access to 
the actual results.227 Moreover, lawyers for CDT and the MLBPA may have seen 
the List, but are the least likely candidates to leak information from it.  Their efforts 
to keep this information confidential would be worthless if they simultaneously 
revealed it.  The case against the government is indeed strong, but the players 
nevertheless still have no remedy.228
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Fourth Amendment can be divided into two clauses.229 The so-called 
“Unreasonableness Clause” provides, “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”230 The “Warrant Clause” then provides, “[N]o warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized.”231 The precise relationship between these two clauses is unclear.232 What 
is “reasonable” under the Unreasonableness Clause “turns, at least in part, on the 
more specific commands of the [W]arrant [C]lause.”233 These commands are 
reflected in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.234
The following Subsections address, in turn, the “plain view” doctrine, the 
223. Id.; CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
224. Schmidt, supra note 73 (Sosa); Schmidt, supra note 62 (Ramirez and Ortiz).
225. Roberts & Epstein, supra note 73.
226. Id.
227. Ortiz Apologizes for ‘Distraction’, supra note 190 (noting that the union could not confirm to 
Ortiz that he tested positive, only that he was on the List).
228. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
229. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
230. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
231. Id.
232. Groh, 540 U.S. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
233. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
234. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 n.1 (1965) (“The 
Fourth Amendment’s policy against unreasonable searches and seizures finds expression in Rule 41 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”).
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constitutional right to privacy found in the Fourth Amendment and the application 
of these legal principles to the players whose names are on the List.
1.  The “Plain View” Doctrine
Not all evidence seized during the execution of a warrant must be pursuant to 
that warrant.235 The “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment permits a 
law enforcement officer to seize evidence or contraband in plain view.236 To 
justify such warrantless seizure, the officer must be lawfully present at the place 
where the object could be plainly viewed, the incriminating character of the object 
must be “immediately apparent” and the officer must have lawful right of access to 
the object.237 Nearly thirty years ago, the Ninth Circuit announced a procedure in 
United States v. Tamura by which “the Government and law enforcement officials 
generally can avoid violating fourth amendment rights” in “the comparatively rare 
instances where documents are so intermingled that they cannot feasibly be sorted 
on site.”238 The procedure includes “sealing and holding the documents pending 
approval by a magistrate of a further search, in accordance with the procedures set 
forth in the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 
. . . . The essential safeguard required is that wholesale removal must be monitored 
by the judgment of a neutral, detached magistrate.”239 Compliance with Tamura 
has become increasingly complex in today’s digital age.  Modern searches and 
seizures frequently involve information stored on electronic media.240 Seizable 
materials are often intermingled with materials not included in the warrant and thus 
theoretically protected under the Fourth Amendment.241 The Tamura guidance, 
which was designed to address “comparatively rare instances” of intermingled 
paper documents may need to be updated accordingly.242
235. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (describing “plain view” 
doctrine).  Additionally, not all searches must be pursuant to a warrant.  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (addressing the “special needs” doctrine, which allows for warrantless 
searches and seizures where “‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable’” (citations omitted)); see also Ramirez, 540 U.S. 
at 572–73 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases stand for the illuminating proposition that warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when they are not.”).
Otherwise, the “plain 
view” doctrine may be expanded ad infinitum.
236. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465.
237. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990).
238. United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir. 1982).  The opinion refers to 
(though not specifically by name) the “plain view” doctrine, but implies that the doctrine does not apply 
to this case.  Id. at 595 n.1 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469–71); cf. id. at 595.
239. Id. at 596.
240. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010).
241. See, e.g., id.
242. Id. at 1176; Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595–96; see infra Part III.C.3 (discussing tension inherent in 
searches of comingled electronic data), Part IV.B.2 (advocating for Tamura-like guidance to remain in 
the opinion).
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2.  Constitutional Right to Privacy
The U.S. Constitution does not mention the word “privacy,” but a number of its 
Amendments indicate that there are limits to government intrusion upon an 
individual’s privacy.243 As relevant to this analysis, the Fourth Amendment creates 
a “right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly 
reserved to the people.”244 This right is captured in the so-called 
“Unreasonableness Clause,” which protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.245
Unlike the common law right to privacy, privacy rights under the Fourth 
Amendment are not affected by professional baseball players’ status as public 
figures.  The plain language of the Amendment contains no such qualifications 
regarding the target of the search and seizure.246 Yet, drawing from another search 
and seizure context, some commentators have argued that, should the government 
invoke the “special needs” doctrine to constitutionally justify suspicionless drug 
testing in professional sports, MLB players will as a corollary be found to have a 
diminished expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.247 The issue in 
dispute in the “special needs” case is quite different from the search and seizure 
issue addressed in this Note: the government secured warrants to seize the 2003 
Survey Testing results, whereas suspicionless testing primarily raises issues of 
probable cause.248
One commentator addressing suspicionless drug testing of MLB players 
analogized professional athletes to politicians and jockeys, relying on two cases 
that found a diminished expectation of privacy for both groups.
Nevertheless, we should not allow the dubious corollary 
conclusion—that MLB players have a diminished expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment—to serve as a justification for disregarding the fourth 
amendment rights of professional athletes in the future.
249
243. A constitutional right to privacy was first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the 
Court found the right in the “penumbras” that emanate from specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.  
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965).  Privacy rights can be found in the First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 481–86 (recognizing marital privacy related to 
birth control under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) 
(privacy related to abortion).
In the first case, 
Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court noted that political candidates “are subject 
to relentless scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the press.  Their day to day 
conduct attracts attention notably beyond the norm in ordinary work 
244. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)).
245. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
246. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
247. E.g., Joshua Peck, Last Resort:  The Threat of Federal Steroid Legislation—Is the Proposed 
Legislation Constitutional?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1820–22 (2006).  To invoke the “special 
needs” doctrine, the government must show that its legitimate interest in the intrusion outweighs the 
individual’s privacy interest.  See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1987).
248. Compare supra Part II.B with Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619–20.
249. Peck, supra note 247, at 1809 & n.308, 1820–22.
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environments.”250 Professional athletes indeed face “‘relentless scrutiny’ from all 
avenues.”251 However, this scrutiny is distinguishable from that which politicians 
face.  Politicians gain clout by taking strong ethical stances on issues facing their
constituents and the government (e.g. fraud in the financial markets).252 As a 
result, they are held to a certain moral standard, digressions from which often lead 
to their resignation.253 Professional athletes, by contrast, typically continue in their 
athletic endeavors in spite of similar moral transgressions.254 The scrutiny faced by 
professional athletes is more properly analogous to that faced by celebrities.255 The 
moral transgressions of professional athletes are a matter of public interest, but bear 
little on their ability to perform in their profession.  In the second case discussed by 
the commentator, Dimeo v. Griffin, the Seventh Circuit, analogizing to persons 
giving urine samples in a routine medical examination, held that random drug 
testing produced only a slight incremental loss of privacy to jockeys.256 The 
opinion also asserts that athletes value privacy less than the average person.257
250. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997).
In 
251. Peck, supra note 247, at 1821–22; see also Heiles, supra note 60, at 358.
252. See, e.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns, Citing Personal Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/nyregion/12cnd-resign.html (discussing Eliot Spitzer’s 
rise to political power).
253. See, e.g., id. (noting that Spitzer, then governor of New York, resigned amid a scandal 
surrounding his involvement with prostitutes).
254. It is not uncommon for professional athletes to engage in extramarital affairs, which the 
media often reports. See, e.g., Rodriguez and Wife Reach Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at D3 
(discussing the divorce between Alex Rodriguez, star third baseman for the New York Yankees, and his 
ex-wife, which involved allegations of infidelity).  However, Rodriguez did not take any time off from 
his sport to deal with these issues.  Cf. Jack Curry, Youkilis Swats Away Any Pitch Promoting Him as 
Candidate for M.V.P., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008, at D3 (mentioning that Rodriguez missed twenty 
games due to a leg injury; no mention of his then-pending divorce); see also Alex Rodriguez,
BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/r/rodrial01.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2011) (indicating that Rodriguez played 138 of 162 games in 2008).  Most recently, Tiger 
Woods took a leave of absence from professional golf following revelations of his extramarital 
activities.  Bob Harig, Tiger Says He’ll Play in Masters, ESPN.COM (Mar. 17, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=4999991.  Nevertheless, he returned to the sport four 
months later.  See id.
255. See Tiffany D. Lipscomb, Can Congress Squeeze the “Juice” Out of Professional Sports?  
The Constitutionality of Congressional Intervention into Professional Sports’ Steroid Controversy, 69 
OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 337 (2008).  Lipscomb argues:
Under a reading of the case law that renders all people in the public eye subject to diminished 
privacy rights, Congress could foreseeably mandate drug testing for musicians and celebrities 
under a similar theory:  celebrity and musician use affects child use.  This slippery slope cannot 
be what the Court mandated in Chandler by rejecting a drug-testing policy for politicians.
Id.
256. Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 682–83 (7th Cir. 1991).
257. Id. at 682.  Unlike most citizens,
Athletes (not limited to boxers), actors, and airline pilots are illustrative of the many types of 
worker whose job is of a character that requires the worker to submit to frequent medical 
examinations. . . . [T]he more habituated [a person] is to [undergoing medical or other intrusions 
into his private realm], the less sensitive he is apt to be [to such intrusions].  A further point . . . 
is that the [person who has frequent medical examinations because his job requires it] voluntarily 
trades away some of his privacy for other goods.  Self-selection will tend to allocate jobs in 
which privacy is limited to persons who value privacy less.
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other words, athletes in general may have a diminished expectation of 
constitutional privacy.  However, the Tenth Circuit, in distinguishing the 
diminished privacy interests in Dimeo on the grounds that jockeys belong to “an 
industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety,” and not on any grounds 
related to how athletes value privacy, arguably treats the assertion that athletes 
value privacy less as dicta.258 The Dimeo court recognized that horse racing is the 
second most dangerous of the common sports behind auto racing, citing statistics 
revealing that on average two jockeys per year are killed and another 100 are 
disabled for at least one week.259 By comparison, baseball players are frequently 
injured, but no one has died from injuries sustained during a game in nearly a 
century.260 Moreover, horse racing is heavily regulated by the government, 
whereas the major professional sports are heavily “regulated” by their own private 
leagues.261 Another commentator argues that professional athletes’ privacy 
interests are diminished because they work in a “closely-regulated industry” 
analogous to one regulated by the government.262 This argument falls short 
because government regulation is simply not analogous to private regulation, 
regardless of how strict the private regulation is.  For the most part, professional 
athletes participate in a collective bargaining process with their respective leagues 
and therefore have agreed to the degree of strictness included in those 
regulations.263
The losing plaintiff in Dimeo did not seek certiorari; the case remains only 
Seventh Circuit precedent.
There is no similar arms length negotiation process with the 
government.
264 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Rutherford arguably 
confines Dimeo to dangerous sports with significant government regulation, further 
limiting the significance of any comparison between jockeys and MLB players.265
Id.
As the analogies to both the politician at issue in Chandler and the jockeys at issue 
in Dimeo have significant shortcomings, whether professional athletes can have a 
diminished expectation of constitutional privacy is not easily ascertainable.  The 
258. Rutherford v. City of Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258, 1262 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Skinner v. 
Railway. Labor Executives.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, at 627 (1989)).
259. Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 683.
260. Ray Chapman died on August 17, 1920, after being hit in the head by a pitch the day before.  
Beaned by a Pitch, Ray Chapman Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1920, 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/sports/year_in_sports/08.17.html.
261. Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d at 681.
262. Heiles, supra note 60, at 358.
263. The four major professional sports leagues have a collective bargaining agreement between 
the respective players union and the team owners.  See generally Major League Baseball Players 
Association: Frequently Asked Questions, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2011); NFL CBA-Related Questions & Answers, SI.COM (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/nfl/01/20/cba.qa/index.html; CBA 101: Owners, Players
Brace for Negotiations, NBA.COM (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.nba.com/2010/news/11/17/labor-
primer/index.html; Collective Bargaining Agreement, NHL.COM, http://www.nhlpa.com/About-Us/CBA 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
264. Dimeo, 943 F.2d 679.
265. Rutherford v. City of Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Supreme Court has previously cautioned “against the assumption that suspicionless 
drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in . . . contexts [other than 
public school student athletics].”266
3.  Seizure of MLB Players’ 2003 Drug Test Results
In other words, the Court will not freely bless 
the diminishing of privacy rights through warrantless searches.
a.  Evaluation of the “Plain View” Argument
Although the government only had warrants for information related to the ten 
BALCO players, investigators seized an entire directory containing the positive 
results of the 2003 Survey Testing.267 The government argued that it had the right 
to the positive test results under the “plain view” doctrine.268 This argument was 
not reached by the three judge panel in CDT I, which held that the entire seizure 
was lawful.269 The en banc panel in CDT III, however, rejected the government’s 
“plain view” argument as a mockery of the Tamura procedural guidance.270 Chief 
Judge Kozinski wrote separately, calling for the government to foreswear reliance
on the “plain view” doctrine in all future warrant applications involving 
intermingled evidence.271
In her dissent, Judge Callahan argued that the majority’s rejection of the “plain 
view” argument is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit case law.272 Callahan wrote, 
“Agent Novitsky [sic] acted with the reasonable purpose of learning the location of 
the relevant material in the Tracey Directory.  Upon encountering other potentially 
incriminating material in the Tracey Directory, he sought a subsequent warrant.”273
She then likened Novitzky’s actions to the actions of the case agent in United 
States v. Giberson.274 In Giberson, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court order 
denying a motion to suppress evidence of child pornography found on a computer 
hard drive while investigating production of false identification cards.275 The case 
agent found images of child pornography while scanning thumbnail images for 
evidence of production of fake I.D.s.276 Significantly, the court did not reach the 
“plain view” argument in deciding the case.277
First, CDT officials cooperated with Novitzky, offering him a document 
Moreover, this comparison fails 
because Novitzky’s actions are distinguishable from the case agent in Giberson.
266. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
267. CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085, 1091, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see supra Part 
II.B.
268. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010).
269. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1112 n.48.
270. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1171; United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
271. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
272. Id. at 1183–84 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. Id. (referencing United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008)).
275. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 889–90.
276. Id. at 885.
277. Id. at 889.
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containing the sought after information prior to his search of the hard drive.278 By 
contrast, the case agents in Giberson searched the defendant’s computer without 
any assistance from the defendant or third parties.279 Second, Novitzky could have 
easily avoided encountering the positive test results while searching the Tracey 
Directory.  Judge Bea’s concurring opinion describes a very simple procedure for 
viewing only the desired results in Microsoft Excel, the spreadsheet format of the 
file containing the test results.280 In Giberson, the case agent utilized a software 
program called ILOOK that retrieves all graphics and images on a computer and 
dumps them into one folder.281 The agent was required to search the entire folder, 
which inevitably would result in uncovering the images of child pornography.282
Moreover, upon finding the images, the agent immediately called his supervisor for 
direction.283 If Novitzky had done the same, CDT I, II and III may never have 
arisen.  Finally, Novitzky intended to find positive test results for players other than 
the ten with BALCO connections.284
Agent Novitsky [sic] intentionally and volitionally scrolled right on the spreadsheet, 
without first having segregated only the responsive files, ‘to see if there was anything 
above and beyond that which was authorized for seizure in the initial warrant.’  This 
demonstrates the seized evidence of illegality was not ‘immediately apparent’ nor in 
‘plain view.’
In fact, Judge Bea concluded:
285
Novitzky’s actions and intentions indicate that he deliberately went on a fishing 
expedition through the Tracey Directory.  In contrast, the case agent in Giberson
neither knew of nor expected to find child pornography in his search for evidence 
of false I.D. production.286 Even after he found the first image, he did not continue 
with the intention of searching for additional pornographic images but found more 
nonetheless.287
As the foregoing comparison reveals, the situations in CDT III and Giberson 
could not be more different.  The government’s argument that the entire List was in 
“plain view” has been deemed a losing one.288 Nevertheless, the government’s 
application of the “plain view” doctrine to its seizure of Tracey Directory had 
significant consequences for the players on the List.289
278. CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008).
279. See Giberson, 527 F.3d at 885.
280. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1181 n.2 (Bea, J., concurring).
281. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 885.
282. See id.
283. Id.
284. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162 at 1188 n.6 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (“So the idea behind taking [the 
entire Tracey Directory] was to take it and later briefly peruse it to see if there was anything above and 
beyond that which was authorized for seizure in the initial warrant.”).
285. Id. at 1180 (Bea, J., concurring).
286. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 885.
287. Id.
288. See CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1177.
289. See id. at 1170; see also infra Part III.B.3.b.
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b.  Implication for Players’ Fourth Amendment Rights
The government’s seizure of the Tracey Directory and subsequent compilation 
of the List created two significant risks to the fourth amendment rights of the 
players on the List.  First, the government planned to question those players about 
where and how they obtained the substance responsible for their positive test.290
Players would be forced to answer questions about activities that took place years 
ago—a potentially difficult task for those players who were not deliberately taking 
illegal PEDs.291 Such inquiries, and any consequences that might flow from them, 
would provide the government with an end run around the Warrant Clause.292 This 
is precisely the type of procedure that would “make a mockery of Tamura and 
render the carefully crafted safeguards in the Central District warrant a nullity.”293
The government’s actions came dangerously close to achieving this result.  
Fortunately, it must return the List and all non-BALCO related specimens.294
Second, there is a heightened risk of public disclosure now that the positive 
results are nicely compiled into one list.  Unwanted public disclosure has in fact 
already occurred despite a court order sealing the List.295 The government’s 
questionable application of the “plain view” doctrine has therefore not only 
impinged upon players’ fourth amendment rights, but has also enabled further 
violations of their common law rights to privacy.296 Regardless of the merits of the 
government’s “plain view” argument, blatant violation of a court order is plain 
wrong.  The en banc panel gave significant weight to these disclosures when 
affirming the Mahan Order.297 Nevertheless, the players remain prone to future 
disclosures despite the outcome of CDT III.298
C. THE FATE OF THE LIST AND THE DICTA: AN ANALYSIS OF CDT III
The CDT III decision resolves the fate of two major aspects of the case: the List 
and the Dicta.  First, CDT (and therefore the MLBPA) will get the 2003 Survey 
Testing results back, a result undoubtedly desirable for the MLBPA.299
290. See Schmidt, supra note 64.
  Second, 
291. See, e.g., Ortiz Apologizes for ‘Distraction’, supra note 190 (“[David Ortiz’s] reputation has 
been called into question.  He does not know specifically why.  And he can't get the information that 
would allow him to offer a full explanation.”).
292. The government has a penchant for perjury investigations in connection with baseball’s drug 
problem.  See Michael Schmidt, Clemens Lied About Doping, Indictment Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
19, 2010, at A1 (reporting indictment of Roger Clemens and mentioning ongoing trial of Barry Bonds);
Associated Press, Tejada Sentenced to Year’s Probation, ESPN.COM, Mar. 26, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4017558 (noting that Miguel Tejada pled guilty to 
withholding information about an ex-teammate’s PED use from congressional investigators).
293. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162 at 1171.
294. Id. at 1175–77.
295. Bloom, supra note 69; see supra Part III.A.2.
296. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1170–71 (noting that the government’s application of the “plain view” 
doctrine makes a “mockery of Tamura”).
297. Id. at 1177.
298. See supra Part I.B.
299. List of Positive Tests Barred from Courts, supra note 147.
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the Ninth Circuit shunted the Dicta from the majority opinion in CDT II to a 
concurring opinion in CDT III.300 It is therefore no longer Ninth Circuit controlling 
law.  This move largely eliminated the controversy surrounding the case and 
essentially eliminated the risk of reversal at the Supreme Court level.301
The MLBPA certainly won this battle, but is it still losing the war?  The test 
results are no longer in the government’s hands, but that does not undo the fact that 
they were there in the first place, let alone the privacy invasions suffered by four 
players to date.302 At this point, it is helpful to determine what, if any, contribution 
CDT III has made to enhancing search and seizure law in the Ninth Circuit.303 In 
addition, it is instructive to explore why the majority in CDT II, and Chief Judge 
Kozinski specifically, felt compelled to provide guidance in the first place, and the 
tension inherent in comingled electronic data searches that the guidance attempts to 
resolve.304 These inquiries shed light on whether the existing law is sufficient to 
prevent another CDT.305
1.  The Precedential Value of CDT III
CDT II caused quite a stir for the government.306  The inclusion of the Dicta 
raised significant concerns over the lawful conduct of computer investigations.307
In support of its petition for rehearing by the full circuit court, the government 
wrote a twenty page brief disputing the legality and content of the Dicta.308 This 
brief was signed by a veritable “Who’s Who” in the Department of Justice, 
including newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Kagan and all of the United 
States Attorneys in the Ninth Circuit.309
Moreover, commentators and the courts had split on how to evaluate CDT II.310
Some practitioners supported the Dicta.311
300. Compare CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 993–1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (majority opinion) with CDT III,
621 F.3d at 1178–80 (concurring opinion).
One practitioner noted that “for too 
301. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the government’s opposition to the Dicta and the legal 
community’s mixed response).
302. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1169; List of Positive Tests Barred from Courts, supra note 147; supra 
Part III.A.2.
303. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.
304. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989.
305. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the possibility that a similar case will arise in the future).
306. See, e.g., Government’s Brief, supra note 141.
307. Id. at 1 (“In some districts, computer searches have ground to a complete halt, and, 
throughout the Circuit, investigations have been delayed or impeded.  Magistrate judges are uniformly 
viewing compliance with the newly announced rules as mandatory, but they are implementing those 
rules in vastly different ways.”).
308. See generally id.
309. See id.; see also Orin Kerr, DOJ Files Brief Supporting Super-En-Banc in CDT, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 24, 2009), http://volokh.com/2009/11/24/doj-files-brief-supporting-super-en-banc-
in-cdt/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2009) (“I don’t think I have ever seen a brief signed by the SG, Deputy SG, 
AAG, DAAG and all of the United States Attorneys in a Circuit.  If you’re presently a DOJ official and 
your name isn’t on the brief, you are probably feeling left out.”).
310. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009).
311. Mumford & Kaplan, supra note 140.
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long . . . searching agents simply mirrored hard drives, taking all the electronic data 
present back to the lab for examination.  The Ninth Circuit was right to protect 
against the ‘erosion of Fourth Amendment rights.’”312  Another scholar took the 
opposite stance, arguing that ex ante restrictions on the execution of computer 
warrants are unwise and should be eliminated.313 Similarly, courts took different 
positions on the Dicta.  A Texas district court adopted the CDT II guidelines in its 
fourth amendment analysis, whereas the Seventh Circuit refused to do so.314
Indeed, CDT II generated widespread uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy and 
application of the Dicta.315
CDT III purported to resolve this uncertainty by simply removing the Dicta from 
the per curiam opinion.316 The conclusion remains the same—the government 
illegally seized the drug test results.317 In fact, a word for word comparison of 
CDT II and III reveals little else changed between the two opinions.318 It appears 
that the Ninth Circuit simply used the cut and paste function in Microsoft Word, 
made a few minor changes to the surrounding text for grammar and readability, and 
then relabeled the opinion per curiam.319
Two conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of CDT II and III: 1) this 
case contributes to the confusion over search and seizure law in the digital age; and 
2) an apparent and misleading oversight in the drafting of the opinion further 
enhances this “contribution.”320 First, CDT III creates additional uncertainty in the 
law by including an ambiguous safe harbor provision and providing an unclear 
precedent to magistrate judges.321 The safe harbor’s ambiguity stems from the 
apparent lack of protection it provides.322 According to Kozinski’s concurring 
opinion, following the Dicta purportedly “offers the government a safe harbor . . . ”
in that “heeding this guidance will significantly increase the likelihood that the 
searches and seizures of electronic storage that they authorize will be deemed 
reasonable and lawful.”323 Safe harbors generally provide the follower with a 
rebuttable presumption that his or her conduct is lawful.  “[S]ignificantly 
increas[ing] the likelihood” that conduct will be lawful is not the same thing.324
Moreover, it is not entirely clear how the government benefits from this safe 
harbor.  CDT III provides an illustrative example.325
312. Id.
If the government followed 
313. Orin Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1292–
93 (2010).
314. Compare United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 946–47 (S.D. Tex. 2009), with United 
States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2010).
315. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989.
316. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
317. Id. at 1172, 1175, 1178.
318. Compare CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, with CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.
319. See CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.
320. Compare CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, with CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.
321. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162 (majority opinion), 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
322. Id. at 1178.
323. Id.
324. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
325. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.
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the Dicta and was nonetheless sued, its actions may be presumed lawful by the safe 
harbor.326 However, following the Dicta requires the government to “forswear 
reliance on the plain view doctrine.”327  If the government did so in CDT III, it 
would have only seized the test results for the ten BALCO players.  There would be 
no improper seizure of the List, and therefore no litigation.  What then would be 
left to litigate?  Certainly, the MLBPA and CDT could still sue the government for 
other wrongful conduct, but by definition that conduct would not be covered (and 
therefore) not protected by the safe harbor.328 The foregoing illustration suggests 
that the safe harbor’s protection is illusory: following the Dicta will either prevent 
the government from engaging in conduct resembling a fourth amendment 
violation or will fail to protect it from conduct that would be unlawful with or 
without the safe harbor.  It would seem unwise for a federal investigator in the 
Ninth Circuit to “heed[] this guidance” knowing that it is not Ninth Circuit 
precedent and the protection it offers is dubious.329
Furthermore, CDT III provides no additional clarity to a magistrate judge 
evaluating a warrant application.330 She can either follow or not follow the Dicta.  
If she ignores the Dicta, she can cite the per curiam opinion in her defense.331 If
she follows the Dicta, she can cite the Kozinski concurrence.332
Or does it?  The second conclusion—that the per curiam opinion contains an 
apparent and misleading drafting error—derives from its penultimate paragraph, 
which reads:
  In other words, 
CDT III leaves magistrate judges in essentially the same position they were in prior 
to the decision.  The case ultimately has little precedential value and perhaps little 
importance in the development of search and seizure law.
Everyone’s interests are best served if there are clear rules to follow that strike a fair 
balance between the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the right of individuals 
and enterprises to the privacy that is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.  Tamura 
has provided a workable framework for almost three decades, and might well have 
sufficed in this case had its teachings been followed.  We have updated Tamura to 
apply to the daunting realities of electronic searches.333
A version of the last sentence above also appears in CDT II.334
326. See id. at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
The CDT II 
327. Id.
328. For example, if a government investigator assaulted CDT personnel, the victims could sue the 
investigator for damages.  See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Bivens action).  This conduct is unrelated to 
the search and seizure, and therefore, by definition, outside the scope of the safe harbor.  See CDT III,
621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
329. See CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
330. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
333. Id. at 1177 (per curium).
334. Compare CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We believe it is useful, therefore, to 
update Tamura to apply to the daunting realities of electronic searches . . . .”), with CDT III, 621 F.3d at 
1177.
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opinion also includes the Dicta, which of course is the “update[]” to Tamura.335
CDT III, on the other hand, no longer contains the Dicta yet claims that the opinion 
“updated Tamura.”336 One searches in vain for anything in CDT III resembling a 
discussion of Tamura in a forward looking manner.337
In sum, CDT III contributed little, if anything, to computer search and seizure 
law.
It would be illogical to 
argue the effect of this sentence is to read the Dicta into the opinion.  Thus, without 
more, this sentence is a drafting error that should have been altered or deleted.  
Instead, it remains on the pages of the Federal Reporter as a further reminder of the 
uncertainty associated with search and seizure law in the digital age.
338 The law failed to protect the MLB players in 2004, and still lacks the 
clarity needed to protect future parties in interest going forward.  As one 
commentator notes, “Ex ante limitations on the execution of computer warrants 
have arisen from the best of intentions.”339
2.  The Rationale for Guidance
The next two Subsections explore these 
intentions as applied to the MLB players in this case.
Throughout what is now the per curiam opinion, the en banc panel took issue 
with the government’s actions pursuant to the BALCO investigation.340  It noted 
how “[m]ore than one of the judges involved in this case below . . . felt misled or 
manipulated by the government’s apparent strategy of moving from district to 
district and judicial officer to judicial officer in pursuit of the same information, 
and without fully disclosing its efforts elsewhere.”341 Additionally, the court noted, 
“It is not surprising, then, that all three of the district judges below were severely 
troubled by the government’s conduct in the case.”342 Simply put, thirteen federal 
judges felt that the government’s actions were wrong.343
As previously discussed, the CDT III opinion is essentially CDT II minus the 
Dicta.344
335. CDT II, 579 F.3d at 1006.
  When Chief Judge Kozinski authored CDT II, he faced a considerable 
336. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1177.
337. Requiring the government to “fully disclose to each judicial officer prior efforts in other 
judicial fora to obtain the same or related information, and what those efforts have achieved,” is indeed 
part of the Dicta.  CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1175.  However, without more, this one point of guidance can 
simply be read as a good procedural reform and not necessarily as an update to Tamura.  If this could be 
read as an update, it would have the effect of reading the concurring opinion into the per curiam opinion.  
Similarly, a charge to magistrate judges to exercise “greater vigilance . . . in striking the right balance 
between the government’s interest in law enforcement and the rights of individuals to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures” is no update to the Tamura guidance.  Id. at 1777.
338. Id. at 1162.
339. Kerr, supra note 313, at 1292.
340. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.
341. Id. at 1175.
342. Id. at 1177 (citing language from district judges and Circuit Judge Thomas).
343. The thirteen judges are:  the three district court judges who ruled against the government; 
Circuit Judge Thomas, the dissenter in CDT I; and the nine circuit judges who comprise the majority in 
CDT III. See supra Part II.C.
344. See supra Parts II.C.2, III.C.1.
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dilemma in deciding how to remedy the government’s wrongdoing.345 His ability 
to protect the rights of the players was limited.  Already, he noted, “[S]ome players 
appear to have suffered this very harm [of public disclosure] as a result of the 
government’s seizure.”346  He was presumably familiar with The Florida Star v. 
B.J.F., and knew the players would have a hard time suing the media.347
Moreover, he likely knew that neither the U.S. government nor the states have 
enacted statutes providing for a damages remedy in most cases where the 
government has mishandled confidential information.348 Finally, he may have 
realized that the MLBPA likely cannot seek a Bivens action against Jeff Novitzky, 
the lead case agent, by application of the qualified immunity defense.349
Instead, Kozinski apparently elected to protect the rights of future persons in the 
players’ position.  Knowing that the Supreme Court previously rejected the notion 
that different rules are necessary for third party searches, Kozinski applied the rules 
to everyone.350
1.  Magistrate judges should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain 
view doctrine in digital evidence cases.
His remedy, the Dicta, is summarized as follows:
2.  Segregation and redaction of electronic data must be done either by specialized 
personnel or an independent third party.  If the segregation is to be done by 
government computer personnel, the government must agree in the warrant 
application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any 
information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
3.  Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of 
information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora.
4.  The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover only the 
information for which it has probable cause, and only that information may be 
examined by the case agents.
5.  The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return 
nonresponsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done 
so and what it has kept.351
Each item addresses a different government wrong.  The first point would 
prevent the government from reaping the benefits of Novitzky’s fishing expedition.  
The second point would prevent Novitzky from performing the initial inspection of 
the electronic data.  The third point would prevent “the government’s apparent 
strategy of moving from district to district and judicial officer to judicial officer in 
345. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009).
346. Id. at 1003.
347. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
348. Cf. id. See also infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing rape shield laws, only one of which provides for 
a damages remedy).
349. See infra Part IV.A.2 (determining availability of Bivens action against Novitzky).
350. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 553, 559 (1978) (cited in Government’s Brief, supra 
note 141, at 11).
351. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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pursuit of the same information, and without fully disclosing its efforts 
elsewhere.”352 The fourth point would prevent Novitzky from “intentionally and 
volitionally scroll[ing] right on the spreadsheet [containing the positive test 
results] . . . ‘to see if there was anything above and beyond that which was 
authorized for seizure in the initial warrant.’”353
Overall, the Dicta simply “update[s] Tamura to apply to the daunting realities of
electronic searches.”
Finally, the last point would 
prevent the protracted litigation that resulted from the government retaining the test 
results.
354  Tamura has not been overturned since it was decided in 
1982; it seems only logical to modernize the decision for the digital age.355 The 
same nine judges voted in favor of the original CDT II opinion and the current per 
curiam opinion.356 Four of those judges joined Kozinski’s concurrence.357 Even 
after the government’s pointed brief attacking the legitimacy of the Dicta, 
Kozinski’s guidance fell one vote short of remaining in the majority opinion.358
3.  The Tension the Dicta Seeks to Resolve
It 
appears that the judges felt so strongly about the injustice that the government 
caused the MLBPA and the inadequacy of the current law to prevent future 
recurrences that they nearly risked certiorari (and possibly reversal) by the Supreme 
Court.
To borrow from the Chief Judge, “A word about Tamura is in order, and this 
seems as good a place as any for it.”359 Tamura, like CDT III, involved computers 
and documents.360 At the time, the court worried that “comparatively rare 
instances” would arise where hard copy documents “are so intermingled that they 
cannot feasibly be sorted on site.”361 Although the opinion does not use the term 
“plain view,” the court’s concern was primarily to avoid the expansion of this 
doctrine.362  Even if those “comparatively rare instances” became commonplace, 
the tension between law enforcement objectives and individual privacy rights 
would be limited to the storage space in a given room or rooms.363
352. Id. at 1175 (per curiam).
Computers in 
1982 lacked the hard drive capacity of computers today, so the machines 
353. Id. at 1181 (Bea, J., concurring).
354. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009).
355. United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 2004).
356. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989; CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.
357. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
358. See CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring); Government’s Brief, supra note 
141.
359. CDT II, 579 F.3d at 996.
360. Tamura, 694 F.2d at 594–95.
361. Id. at 595.
362. See id. (“[T]he wholesale seizure for later detailed examination of records not described in the 
warrant is significantly more intrusive, and has been characterized as ‘the kind of investigatory dragnet 
that the fourth amendment was designed to prevent.’”) (citation omitted)); see also id. at 595 n.1 (citing, 
but not identifying by name, the “plain view” doctrine).
363. Id. at 595.
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themselves were not storage units.364
Nearly three decades later, those “comparatively rare instances” have indeed 
become commonplace.365 Computers have evolved into ubiquitous repositories of 
data, becoming frequent targets of search warrants.366 Remarkably, the Tamura 
guidance, which requires the sealing and holding of documents pending approval 
by a neutral magistrate, is equipped to deal with this new reality.367 To the 
contrary, the “plain view” doctrine is not.368 The tension at the heart of Tamura
has expanded from the four corners of a room to the boundless capacity of today’s 
computer.369
The distinction between Giberson and CDT III illustrates the difficulty of 
policing electronic searches.370 Giberson allows the innocent agent to seize the 
child pornography he stumbles upon using search technology, whereas CDT III 
prevents the government from retaining the fruits of Novitzky’s fishing 
expedition.371 Yet the investigator’s intent, arguably the most important 
distinguishing factor between the two cases, is not always so important, let alone 
readily identifiable.372  In cases where the investigator’s intent is not dispositive, 
there are no safeguards to prevent the government from performing wholesale 
seizures.373
Moreover, the target of the search warrant is fraught with ambiguity.  Computers 
are not the only sources of electronic data.  Information is also stored on discs and 
external drives as small as a thumb.374  If unrestrained, investigators can use the 
“plain view” doctrine to search and seize almost anything.375
364. In the early 1980s, hard drive capacity was five megabytes, whereas today’s hard drives can 
store up to two terabytes (or 400,000 times greater capacity).  Amazing Facts and Figures About the 
Evolution of Hard Disk Drives, PINGDOM (Feb. 18, 2010), http://royal.pingdom.com/2010/02/18/
Without proper 
amazing-facts-and-figures-about-the-evolution-of-hard-disk-drives.
365. Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595.
366. See Amazing Facts and Figures About the Evolution of Hard Disk Drives, supra note 364;
see also CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).
367. See Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595–96.
368. See Mumford & Kaplan, supra note 140 (“What can be seen with eyes is often far less 
expansive than what can be discovered with search technologies, and the amount of information in a 
room, a house, a file pales in comparison to the volume of data, the millions of documents, that even a 
single hard drive can contain.”).
369. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591.
370. Compare United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008), with CDT III, 621 F.3d 
1162.  See supra Part III.B.3.a (noting the following distinctions:  the availability of third party 
assistance in the search, the ability of the investigator to avoid the incriminating material and the 
investigator’s mens rea).
371. Compare Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, with CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162.  See supra Part III.B.3.a.
372. Compare Giberson, 527 F.3d at 885 (noting that the case agent immediately called a
supervisor for direction upon finding the incriminating images), with CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1171 (“The 
government agents obviously were counting on the search to bring constitutionally protected data into 
the plain view of the investigating agents.”).
373. Cf. Mumford & Kaplan, supra note 140 (“For too long . . . searching agents simply mirrored 
hard drives, taking all the electronic data present back to the lab for examination.”).
374. See Amazing Facts and Figures About the Evolution of Hard Disk Drives, supra note 364.
375. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1171.  The court writes:
Since the government agents ultimately decide how much to actually take, this will create a 
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protections in place—guidance or otherwise—private citizens will continue to 
witness “the ‘erosion of Fourth Amendment rights.’”376
IV.  REMEDIES
The BALCO investigation 
has demonstrated that the government may not always be the best source of that 
protection.  To that end, this Note proposes the remedies described in Part IV.
Two separate injuries occurred in the course of the BALCO investigation.  First, 
Major League Baseball players whose confidential drug testing information was
stored at CDT and Quest were subject to an unreasonable search and seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment.377 Second, to date, four of the players with positive test 
results have fallen victim to an improper disclosure of their confidential 
information while this information was under government control.378
Section A examines existing remedies available for each injury, ultimately 
concluding that these remedies are inadequate.  Section B then proposes a civil 
remedy designed to protect persons from improper disclosure of sensitive 
information before concluding with a proposal to resolve the uncertain state of 
computer search and seizure law.
A. EXISTING REMEDIES
1.  Rule 41(g) Motion
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a remedy for persons 
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property.  Those persons may file a 
Rule 41(g) motion for the return of that property.379 This motion protects the 
property or privacy interests impaired by the seizure.380 A district court must 
balance the four factors set forth in Ramsden v. United States to determine whether 
to allow the government to retain the property, return the property to the movant or 
reach a compromise solution that attempts to accommodate the interests of all 
parties.381
1) whether the Government displayed a callous disregard for the constitutional rights 
These factors are:
powerful incentive for them to seize more rather than less:  Why stop at the list of all baseball 
players when you can seize the entire Tracey Directory?  Why just that directory and not the 
entire hard drive?  Why just this computer and not the one in the next room and the next room 
after that?  Can’t find the computer?  Seize the Zip disks under the bed in the room where the 
computer once might have been. (citation omitted).
Id.
376. Mumford & Kaplan, supra note 140.
377. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1177.
378. See supra Parts III.A.2, III.B.3.b.
379. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
380. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1173.  In contrast, a suppression motion under Rule 41(h) applies to 
criminal defendants who are seeking to exclude evidence wrongfully seized.  Id. at 1173; see also FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41(h).  As the players are not criminal defendants here, this motion is not applicable as a 
remedy.  CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1172.
381. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1173.
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of the movant; 2) whether the movant has an individual interest in and need for the 
property he wants returned; 3) whether the movant would be irreparably injured by 
denying return of the property; and 4) whether the movant has an adequate remedy at 
law for the redress of his grievance.382
CDT and the MLBPA filed at least four of these motions in three separate 
districts during a two month span in 2004.383 Each district court ruled in favor of 
the movant, resulting in the Illston Order, Cooper Order and Mahan Order.384 In 
CDT III, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the government’s appeal of the Cooper Order 
as untimely and affirmed the Mahan Order.385 In affirming the Mahan Order, the 
court balanced the four Ramsden factors in favor of the MLBPA.386 It quickly 
dispensed with three of the four factors.387 First, the MLBPA was “plainly 
aggrieved by the deprivation” as the seizure worked a breach of its negotiated 
confidentiality agreement, a violation of its members’ privacy interests and an 
interference with the operation of its business.388 Second, some of its members 
already suffered “irreparable injury” because the property was not returned.389
Third, the government conceded that the MLBPA lacked an adequate remedy at 
law.390 Finally, the court balanced “[t]he only Ramsden factor fairly in dispute”—
whether the government showed a callous disregard for the constitutional rights of 
the MLBPA—in favor of the MLBPA, agreeing with the conclusion of Judge 
Mahan and the other district court judges.391
As a result of the Ninth Circuit decision, the MLBPA will get its test results 
back.392 For those players who did not test positive, this remedy is adequate (albeit 
six years late).  However, this remedy is inadequate for any player who tested 
positive, particularly the four players whose positive test results were disclosed to 
the media.393 The court’s final decision cannot protect their privacy interests from 
such improper disclosures.394
Moreover, a Rule 41(g) motion is ineffective in general to prevent the 
dissemination of private information.  The court can order the physical return of the 
item(s) containing that information (in this case, the hard drive image and the urine 
specimens), but can do nothing to prevent a tipster from revealing what he or she 
382. Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993).
383. See infra Appendix.
384. Id.
385. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1177.  The government did not appeal the Illston Order.  Id. at 1170.
386. Id. at 1174.
387. Id. at 1173.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.; CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008).  Neither opinion sheds any light on the 
rationale behind the government’s concession.
391. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1174.
392. Id. at 1177–78; List of Positive Tests Barred from Courts, supra note 147.
393. Cf. id. at 1174 (“The risk to the players associated with disclosure . . . is very high.  Indeed, 
some players appear to have already suffered this very harm as a result of the government’s seizure. . . . 
Judge Mahan certainly did not abuse his broad discretion when balancing these equities [in granting 
their Rule 41(g) motion].”).
394. See id.
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knows.395
2.  Bivens Action
Thus, a Rule 41(g) motion is inadequate protection where a player’s 
information has been unlawfully seized.
In general, persons can sue federal law enforcement officials in their personal 
capacities for monetary damages under a judge-made doctrine introduced in Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.396 The Supreme Court has been very 
hesitant to imply other private actions for money damages.397 Instead, the Court 
has limited the expansion of the Bivens doctrine.398 Consistent with this posture, 
circuit courts including the Ninth Circuit have been nearly unanimous in 
concluding that Bivens actions are unavailable for alleged constitutional violations 
by Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) agents and officials pursuant to the 
assessment and collection of taxes.399
The law is a little less certain when the IRS agent is not assessing or collecting 
federal taxes.  IRS special agents investigate federal crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the IRS.400 This jurisdiction extends beyond tax cases to include “bankruptcy 
fraud, money laundering, identity theft, obstruction of justice, and perjury, as well 
as offenses under [the] Bank Secrecy Act.”401 These actions are clearly different 
from the tax assessment and collection activities to which Bivens does not apply.402
In fact, some circuits have allowed Bivens claims against IRS special agents for 
alleged fourth amendment violations.403 It appears that the Ninth Circuit is in 
accord.404
Government officials performing discretionary functions have a qualified 
immunity defense that shields them from liability for civil damages “insofar as 
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Thus, an individual can probably bring a Bivens action in the Ninth 
Circuit against an IRS special agent.
405
395. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g); supra Part III.A.2.
The defense of qualified 
396. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
Bivens covers claims against federal law enforcement officers.  Id. at 395.  If state and local law 
enforcement officials were also involved, the players have a similar remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2006).  The analysis is identical under either cause of action.  Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 
(1999).
397. Judicial Watch Inc. v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401, 409 (4th Cir. 2003).
398. Id. (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001)).
399. See Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all held Bivens actions inapplicable for claims arising from 
federal tax assessment or collection.”); accord id. at 1186.
400. ROBERT S. FINK, TAX CONTROVERSIES: AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, TRIALS § 5.02 (2009).
401. Id. at § 5.02 n.32.
402. See Adams, 355 F.3d at 1184, 1186.
403. See, e.g., Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521, 1527 (10th Cir. 1994).
404. See Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants, which included IRS special agents, on plaintiff’s Bivens action); 
Vaillancourt v. United States, 188 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (dismissing 
Bivens action against IRS special agents as time barred).
405. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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immunity is subject to a two part test.406 A court “must first determine whether the 
plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, 
proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the 
alleged violation.”407 The Supreme Court has determined that deciding the 
constitutional question prior to the qualified immunity question has financial, legal, 
social and personal benefits.408
Jeff Novitzky, the lead case agent in the BALCO investigation, was, at the time, 
an IRS special agent.409 Therefore, he probably can be sued under Bivens for 
violations of MLB players’ fourth amendment rights.410 However, he will likely 
succeed in invoking the qualified immunity defense.411 Under the first prong, the 
players have alleged the deprivation of their fourth amendment rights pursuant to 
the government seizure of the Tracey Directory.412 CDT III held this seizure to be 
unlawful, thereby satisfying this prong.413 On the other hand, the second prong is 
problematic for the players.414 The “plain view” doctrine in the Ninth Circuit was 
not “clearly established at the time of the violation” and remains unclear after CDT 
III.415
This is a disturbing result for two reasons.  First, Novitzky’s questionable 
actions led to the common law and constitutional privacy violations suffered by the 
players.  The decision to raid BALCO was largely due to Novitzky’s efforts in a 
green dumpster.
Kozinski’s effort to update Tamura would not be necessary if the law was 
already settled.  Therefore, the qualified immunity defense will likely bar the 
players’ Bivens claim against Novitzky.
416 Novitzky turned down a document containing the drug test 
results for the ten BALCO players, instead choosing to seize the Tracey 
Directory.417 Finally, it was Novitzky who “later briefly peruse[d] [the Tracey 
Directory] to see if there was anything above and beyond that which was 
authorized for seizure in the initial warrant.”418
Second, Novitzky may have had ulterior motives for participating in the 
BALCO investigation.  He reportedly hoped to profit from his involvement, talking 
It is certainly fair to conclude that, 
but for Jeff Novitzky, there would be no List.  Without a List, there would be no 
test results to leak.




409. CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085, 1092, 1093 n.20 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Pessah, supra note 82.
410. See supra notes 402–04 and accompanying text.
411. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.
412. See CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010).  A claim that one’s fourth amendment 
rights have been violated is inherent in a Rule 41(g) motion.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) (“A person 
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for 
the property's return.”).
413. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1177–78.
414. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.
415. See id.; see also supra Part III.C.1.
416. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
418. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1188 n.6 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
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openly with a colleague about securing a book deal.419 To that end, he apparently 
tipped off the media about the BALCO raid in September 2003.420 He also used 
questionable tactics during the execution of the warrant to search CDT and is 
accused of lying in his investigative report.421 Moreover, he allegedly had a 
personal vendetta against Barry Bonds, a BALCO client.422 Granted, much of the 
case for Novitzky’s ulterior motives relies on hearsay evidence.423  Nonetheless, 
Novitzky still seized the Tracey Directory with the intent to “briefly peruse it to see 
if there was anything above and beyond that which was authorized for seizure in 
the initial warrant.”424 In the process, he dragged the rest of the MLBPA through 
six years of protracted litigation and four improper disclosures.425 Yet he is 
protected under the shield of qualified immunity from a suit for money damages.426
B. PROPOSED REMEDIES
As made clear in Section A, the MLBPA has no adequate remedy at law against 
Jeff Novitzky and the other federal investigators due to operation of the qualified 
immunity defense.427 Furthermore, Alex Rodriguez, Sammy Sosa, Manny Ramirez 
and David Ortiz have no adequate remedy for their additional injury due to 
improper disclosure of their 2003 Survey Testing results.428
Extending a remedy to allow the MLBPA to sue Novitzky would be both 
difficult and unproductive.  His defense of qualified immunity is not easily 
419. Littman, supra note 87.  Novitzky claims his comments were in jest.  Pessah, supra note 82.  
However, in a sworn statement before Judge Illston, Novitzky denied any such conversation took place.
Jonathan Littman, Novitzky Was Target of Secret Probe, YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 4, 2009), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=li-novitzky020309.
420. Littman, supra note 87 (“The search of BALCO, which was supposed to remain secret for 
countless investigative reasons, now resembles an episode of Cops.”); Pessah, supra note 82.
421. Pessah, supra note 82 (describing allegations that Novitzky lied about Victor Conte’s 
confession and questionable tactics by Novitzky during the investigation, including his decision to 
image the hard drive and inspect its contents).  The IRS investigated Novitzky, but ultimately cleared 
him of any wrongdoing.  Id.; see also Littman, supra note 87 (detailing IRS internal investigation on 
Novitzky and its consequences:  favorable plea deals for Conte and Greg Anderson, and suggestion that 
Bonds may similarly benefit).
422. Littman, supra note 87.  Novitzky is reported as saying:
“That Bonds.  He’s a great athlete,” White says Novitzky told him.  “You think he’s on 
steroids?”  White took a minute before replying . . . “I think they’re all on steroids.  All of our 
top major leaguers.”  Novitzky seemed to only care about Bonds.  “He’s such an asshole to the 
press,” he said.  “I’d sure like to prove it.”
Id.  Novitzky, not surprisingly, claimed he had no idea why White thought he was out to get Bonds.  
Pessah, supra note 82.  In a sworn statement before Judge Illston, Novitzky also denied initiating the 
BALCO investigation “for personal reasons against any of its subjects or witnesses.”  Littman, supra 
note 87.
423. See supra note 422.
424. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1188 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (Callahan, J., dissenting).
425. See supra Parts II.C, III.A.2.
426. See supra notes 409–15 and accompanying text.
427. See supra Part IV.A.
428. See supra Part III.A.2.
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repudiated.429 Moreover, a successful Bivens action against Novitzky is unlikely to 
yield a large monetary award.430
1.  Damages Claim Against the Government
Therefore, this Section proposes a statutory 
remedy to protect against public disclosure of sensitive information under 
government control and advocates for the further amendment of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure to further clarify search and seizure law for the digital age.
Congress and state legislatures should statutorily extend the damages remedy 
contemplated in Florida Star v. B.J.F.431 In this case, a newspaper published the 
name of a rape victim it obtained from a police report found in the sheriff’s 
department pressroom.432 The Supreme Court held that the newspaper was not 
liable for the publication.433
To the extent sensitive information is in the government’s custody, it has even greater 
power to forestall or mitigate the injury caused by its release.  The government may 
classify certain information, establish and enforce procedures ensuring its redacted 
release, and extend a damages remedy against the government or its officials where 
the government’s mishandling of sensitive information leads to its dissemination.
Where the information is entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than 
punishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against the 
dissemination of private facts.
In addressing the disclosure of sensitive information, 
the Court observed:
434
Nevertheless, it does not appear that Congress or any state has extended such a 
remedy against itself or its officials that covers this situation.435 Thus, the four 
players mentioned above have no remedy for their injuries suffered as a result of 
the improper disclosure.  They have, at best, a remote chance of identifying the 
individual(s) responsible.  If identification were possible, recovery in a suit for 
damages would be fairly limited given that the culprits are likely government 
employees.436
429. See supra notes 409–15 and accompanying text.
If identification were to prove impossible, the players would need to 
430. At the time of the BALCO raid, Novitzky was making $145,000, which is top salary for a 
special agent.  Pessah, supra note 82.  As a result, a multimillion dollar damage award may leave him 
insolvent, precluding collection and therefore remediation of the injury.
431. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
432. Id. at 526–27.
433. Id. at 541.
434. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
435. Several states have enacted rape shield laws aimed at limiting the information that the 
government can disseminate.  See Daniel M. Murdock, A Compelling State Interest:  Constructing a 
Statutory Framework for Protecting the Identity of Rape Victims, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1177, 1187 n.102 
(2007) (citing eleven such statutes).  These statutes are analogous to the remedy sought here, but are 
limited in application to victims of sex offenses.  See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-c (1992).
Moreover, not all of these statutes provide for a private right of action.  Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 
293 (Deering 2011) (no private right of action), with N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-c (1992) (private 
right of action for improper disclosure of a sex offense).
436. See, e.g., supra note 430 (describing Novitzky’s salary, which was the top salary for his 
position at the time).
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subpoena Sports Illustrated or the New York Times, the two media outlets which 
reported the positive results, and make a compelling argument for overcoming the 
qualified reporter’s privilege.437 Even assuming a successful argument could be 
made, the players have no one to sue because Congress has not extended such a 
remedy against the federal government.438
Congress and each state legislature should therefore enact legislation that 
provides a damages remedy against any person, entity, State or the United States 
for improper disclosure of information under court seal.
  A damages remedy against the 
government is necessary regardless of the merits of the government seizure.  
Absent this statutory remedy, these media leaks would go unpunished.
439  The remedy must be 
civil, rather than a criminal penalty.  Because the source of the disclosure is often 
impossible to identify, it is more beneficial to the victim to be able to sue the 
government itself.440 In addition, criminal penalties, which may prove to be an 
effective deterrent, do not compensate the victim for the injury.441
2.  Clarify Modern Search and Seizure Law
This statutory 
remedy will also indirectly serve a deterrent function.  If the government knows it 
will be (vicariously) liable, then it will put into place stronger procedures to 
preserve confidentiality, much like banks have created anti-money-laundering 
departments to regulate the conduct of their employees.
Both the Government Brief and Judge Callahan’s dissent in CDT III argued that 
the Dicta conflicted with the recent amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(f)(1)(B), which went into effect December 1, 2009.442
In a case involving the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of 
electronically stored information, the inventory may be limited to describing the 
physical storage media that were seized or copied.  The officer may retain a copy of 
the electronically stored information that was seized or copied.
The Rule now 
reads:
443
The Dicta, however, requires the government to “provide the issuing officer 
with a return disclosing precisely what it has obtained as a consequence of the 
search, and what it has returned to the party from whom it was seized.”444
437. Roberts & Epstein, supra note 73.
Furthermore, the government “should not retain copies of such returned data unless 
438. See supra note 435.
439. Persons are included in this remedy because the government or its agents are not necessarily 
always the source of the disclosure.  See, e.g., Egelko, supra note 220 (noting that source of leaked 
grand jury testimony was former attorney representing BALCO).
440. See Murdock, supra note 435, at 1196.
441. Indeed, a criminal penalty already exists:  contempt of court.  See generally 17 C.J.S. 
Contempt § 3 (2010). Unfortunately, this proved to be an ineffective deterrent in this case.
442. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1183 (9th Cir. 2010) (Callahan, J., dissenting); Government’s Brief, 
supra note 141, at 12–13.
443. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(B).
444. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1179 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
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it obtains specific judicial authorization to do so.”445
Assuming Rule 41(f)(1)(B) supersedes this point of guidance, the newly 
amended Rule still lacks sufficient clarity.446 In particular, it squarely conflicts 
with the holding in CDT III.447 A federal investigator following Rule 41(f)(1)(B) 
can do in a future case exactly what Novitzky did here.448 He or she can enter CDT 
with a warrant, make a determination (good faith or otherwise) that the data is too 
intermingled to be reasonably sorted onsite, and seize or copy the electronic storage 
media.449 After returning to the office, the investigator must describe, at a 
minimum, the physical storage media seized or copied, but otherwise can keep a 
copy of what was taken.450 Even though the majority does not address Rule 
41(f)(1)(B), the judges were certainly aware of the new amendment, having read 
the Government Brief.451
Moreover, what stops CDT III from arising again?  The “plain view” doctrine 
might, but its application to computer searches and seizures is not entirely clear.
Therefore, CDT III cannot simply be distinguished from 
Rule 41(f)(1)(B) on its facts.
452
The answer may turn on whether the case is more like Giberson or CDT III, cases 
whose key distinctions lay in the investigator’s intent.453  This standard is 
unworkable in cases where intent cannot be easily ascertained.  The advisory 
committee notes are inapposite.454
Before discussing the proper remedy, we should ask whether a case like CDT III 
will arise again.  Undoubtedly, any warrant authorizing search of a computer will 
raise concerns similar to those of the MLBPA.  But how likely will baseball 
players, or professional athletes in general, be subject to this situation again?  
Interestingly enough, the seeds for a CDT redux are already being planted.  MLB 
Commissioner Bud Selig began testing certain minor league players (not subject to 
the collective bargaining agreement) for HGH in 2010.
Federal investigators in this circuit need a 
clearer standard than that provided in the Rule to avoid violating the fourth 
amendment rights of the subjects of future investigations.
455 Since this process 
involves a blood test, MLB and the MLBPA will need to agree to test for HGH in 
the next collective bargaining agreement—the current agreement expires after the 
2011 season.456
445. Id.
It is easy to imagine the parties agreeing to anonymous testing 
446. Id. at 1183 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (“Presumably these suggestions are superseded by the 
detailed amendments to Rule 41, which provide comprehensive guidance in this area.”).
447. Id. at 1177–78.
448. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(B).
449. See id.
450. See id.
451. Government’s Brief, supra note 141.
452. See supra Part III.C.1.
453. See supra Part III.B.3.a (comparing Giberson with CDT III).
454. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1) advisory committee’s note (making no mention of the “plain 
view” doctrine).
455. See Minor Leaguers to Be Tested for HGH, supra note 60.  It is unclear whether the results 
will remain anonymous.  Cf. id.
456. See generally Major League Baseball Players Association:  Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 263.
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initially, given the precedent set by the 2003 testing.  For CDT to arise again, the 
government just needs to find a drug ring to bust.457
To clarify the law for future investigations, the Supreme Court should amend 
Rule 41(f)(1)(B) to address the limits of the “plain view” doctrine in electronic 
search and seizures.458  The exact parameters of this doctrine in this context are 
unclear and should be explored through the Court’s rule making procedure.459
Segregation and redaction of electronic data must be done either by specialized 
personnel or an independent third party.  If the segregation is to be done by 
government computer personnel, the government must agree in the warrant 
application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any 
information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
To 
that end, this Note proposes that the Court add the following as the penultimate 
sentence in Rule 41(f)(1)(B):
460
This amendment does not go so far as to require the government to “forswear 
reliance on the “plain view” doctrine.”461 Nevertheless, it establishes a “Chinese 
wall” that prevents federal agents, regardless of motive, from expanding the “plain 
view” doctrine at will in a federal investigation.  It also ensures that innocent third 
parties like the MLBPA are not victimized by the seizure of electronic storage 
media.  If this rule had been in effect in April 2004, or if Novitzky had simply 
followed the warrant protocol, Novitzky would have received the test results of the 
ten BALCO players, and those players only, without further issue.462
V.  CONCLUSION
This rule 
provides stronger protection than a well policed warrant application process 
because it removes the opportunity to handle the evidence from the Novitzkys of 
the world.  In the end, the government will get its evidence and the public, in 
particular the players, will finally be able to rest easy.
In the first paragraph of the CDT III opinion, the en banc panel writes: “This 
case is about a federal investigation into steroid use by professional baseball 
players.  More generally, however, it’s about the procedures and safeguards that 
federal courts must observe in issuing and administering search warrants and 
subpoenas for electronically stored information.”463
457. It may have already found one.  See Anthony Galea on Path to Trial, ESPN.COM (Oct. 14, 
2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=5686404 (describing indictment of Anthony Galea, 
a Canadian doctor who treated Tiger Woods and Alex Rodriguez, who is accused of smuggling HGH 
and other drugs across the U.S.-Canadian border).
For the MLBPA, and 
458. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(B).
459. As discussed in Part III.C.1, the “plain view” doctrine remains unclear following CDT III.  As 
discussed in this Part, IV.B.2, the scope of the “plain view” doctrine is unclear under the newly amended 
Rule 41(f)(1)(B).
460. See CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (citations 
omitted).
461. Id. at 1178.
462. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
463. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1165–66 (per curium).
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professional athletes generally, this case takes on an additional meaning: whether 
the law adequately protects their confidential information.  As public figures, 
professional athletes do not have the same guarantees of privacy afforded most 
ordinary citizens.464
It may be difficult to find sympathy for the 104 players who are on a list of what 
the government believes to be positive test results from the 2003 Survey Testing.
However, they should have the same privacy expectations 
when they contractually negotiate for them.
465
Steroids were rampant in Major League Baseball for nearly two decades.466
Despite what admitted users would like you to believe, using a performance 
enhancing drug, particularly one that is prohibited by the league and/or illegal 
under the laws of the United States, is cheating.467 PEDs may not necessarily 
enhance a player’s performance to a level superior to that of his or her peers, but, at 
a minimum, they enhance recovery and allow players to perform at any level for a 
longer period of time.468 But this blanket condemnation ignores the fact that legal 
substances could have caused a positive test or that many substances that are now 
controlled substances were not listed on any Schedule back then.469 When viewed 
in this light, it is difficult to condemn the players on the List for conduct that was 
neither illegal nor banned by baseball.470 It is further disturbing that many are so 
willing to support the improper disclosures of names on the List, in clear violation 
of the law.471
In its pursuit of a regional drug ring that may have involved money laundering, 
the government permitted the dumpster diving of one overzealous IRS special 
agent to balloon into six years of litigation and over $50 million wasted on an 
outcome that would have been the same if the government had followed its own 
warrant protocol.472
APPENDIX
  Major League Baseball players’ constitutional and common 
law rights were violated in the process.  Under the current state of the law, CDT III 
could easily arise again.  Legislatures and the Supreme Court must fashion 
remedies to deter government personnel from allowing this history to repeat itself.
The procedural history of United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing is fairly 
464. See supra Part III.A.1.
465. See supra Part I.B.
466. See supra Part I.
467. See, e.g., Mark McGwire Offers Steroid Apology, supra note 204 (noting that McGwire 
refused to back off his assertion that steroids did not help his in-game performance).
468. See Mike Gimbel, Did Steroids Help Alex Rodriguez?, THE HARDBALL TIMES (Feb. 12, 
2009), http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/did-steroids-help-alex-rodriguez.
469. See Bloom, supra note 57; see also supra note 29 (indicating that andro was not classified as 
a controlled substance until 2004).
470. See supra note 29 (indicating that andro was not classified as a controlled substance until 
2004); see also Bloom, supra note 57 (indicating that andro was not banned by MLB until 2004).
471. See, e.g., Ortiz Apologizes for ‘Distraction’, supra note 190 (noting that past and present 
players have called for the names on the List to be released).
472. See Pessah, supra note 82.
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complicated and difficult to glean from CDT I and III.473 This Appendix provides 
the interested reader with a detailed timeline of events at the district court level.  As 
a point of reference, the government searched the premises of CDT and Quest on 
April 8, 2004.474
A. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
On April 9, 2004, the MLBPA arranged an emergency hearing with Judge White 
regarding its motion to quash the March grand jury subpoena.475 The union sought 
an order restricting the government from disseminating any information it had 
obtained until the union could litigate the motion to quash or a Rule 41(g) motion 
to return the seized property.476 Judge White accepted the government’s 
representation that it would not disseminate the information.477
On April 22, 2004, the government informed CDT in a letter that it was 
withdrawing the January subpoenas, which requested the drug testing information 
for all MLB players, and modifying the March subpoena to reflect only ten 
BALCO players.478 This was hardly a concession; the government now possessed 
the Tracey Directory.479  Moreover, the government never actually withdrew the 
January subpoena.480
On April 30, 2004, on the same day it filed its opposition to the union’s Rule 
41(g) motion, the government obtained a fifth search warrant from Magistrate 
Judge Howard Lloyd authorizing it to search all electronic data related to MLB 
drug testing in the Tracey Directory and “seize all data pertaining to illegal drug 
use by any member of [M]ajor [L]eague [B]aseball.”481  The government sought 
the warrant in this district because its copy of the directory was in the San Jose, 
California office of the IRS.482
[I]t is logical to assume that a review of the drug testing records for other players may 
provide additional evidence of the use of similar illegal performance-enhancing drugs 
which establishes a link to the charged defendants in the charged [BALCO] case, 
given the relatively small number of professional baseball players and the closely-knit 
professional baseball community.
In support of its warrant, Novitzky’s affidavit 
claimed:
483
The government did not notify CDT, as the Tracey Directory was already in its 
473. CDT I, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008); CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
474. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1092–93.
475. Id. at 1121 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 1095 n.25, 1121 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
479. See id. at 1093 n.20.
480. Id. at 1121 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
481. Id. at 1093–94 & n.20, 1122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
482. Id. at 1094 n.20.
483. Id. at 1122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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possession.484
On May 6, 2004, the government served grand jury subpoenas on CDT and 
Quest for the materials sought in the April 30 and May 5 search warrants.485 The 
subpoenas contained the names of the players who allegedly tested positive despite 
the government’s assertion to Judge White that it would not disclose the names.486
The government also sent a letter to Quest instructing it not to disclose the 
existence of this subpoena for fear that any such disclosure “could impede the 
investigation . . . .”487 Quest complied with the May 6 subpoena and produced 
hundreds of pages of documents, but the government deferred CDT’s compliance 
pending resolution of the Rule 41(g) motions.488
CDT and the MLBPA filed a Rule 41(g) motion on June 7, 2004 for return of 
electronic documents seized pursuant to the fifth warrant.489 On August 9, 2004, 
Judge Susan Illston granted their June 7 motion, known as the Illston Order.490 The 
government did not appeal this ruling.491
On July 9, 2004, Judge White held a hearing on the motion to quash the grand 
jury subpoenas, but deferred action pending the outcome of the Rule 41(g) 
motions.492
On August 31, 2004, having lost its opposition to the June 7 motion, the 
government revoked its indefinite deferral of CDT’s compliance with the May 6 
subpoena and instructed CDT to comply by September 14.
It does not appear that Judge White ruled on this motion.
493 On September 13, 
2004, the MLBPA filed a motion to quash the subpoena.494 On December 10, 
2004, Judge Illston granted the union’s motion to quash the May 6 subpoena, 
known as the Illston Quashal.495 The government timely appealed this ruling.496
B. CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
On April 24, 2004, the MLBPA filed a Rule 41(g) motion seeking return of the 
information seized from CDT.497 Six days later, the government filed its 
opposition to the motion, arguing that, despite CDT’s agreement not to destroy or 
alter documents, it had “good-faith reasons to believe that CDT was detrimentally 
delaying the investigation . . . .”498
484. Id. at 1094 n.20.
485. Id. at 1122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 1095.
489. Id. at 1123 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
490. Id. at 1123–25.
491. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010).
492. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1123 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
493. Id. at 1095.
494. Id.
495. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2009); CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1127–28 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).
496. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1095.
497. Id. at 1121 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
498. Id.
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On May 5, 2004, the government obtained a search warrant from Magistrate 
Judge Rosalyn Chapman for CDT’s records of players who tested positive.499 The 
warrant application conceded that no specific evidence existed linking these players 
to BALCO, nor did the application disclose the pending proceedings regarding the 
grand jury subpoenas.500
On August 13, 2004, Magistrate Judge Johnson issued a report recommending 
denial of the Rule 41(g) motion related to property seized from CDT.501 On 
October 1, 2004, Judge Florence-Marie Cooper granted the motion, known as the 
Cooper Order, declining to adopt Magistrate Judge Johnson’s recommendation.502
On November 19, 2004, the government moved for reconsideration, which Judge 
Cooper denied on February 9, 2005.503 On March 9, 2005, the government 
appealed both the Cooper Order and the denial of the motion for reconsideration.504
C. DISTRICT OF NEVADA
On April 26, 2004, the MLBPA filed a Rule 41(g) motion seeking return of the 
information seized from Quest.505
On May 5, 2004, the government obtained a search warrant from Magistrate 
Judge Leavitt for the urine samples of those players who tested positive.506  The 
warrant application conceded that no specific evidence existed linking these players 
to BALCO.507 The next day, the government executed the warrant, seizing 
between 250 and 300 samples (players gave multiple samples).508
On May 21, 2004, CDT and the MLBPA filed a Rule 41(g) motion for return of 
the samples seized from Quest.509 On August 19, 2004, Judge James Mahan orally 
granted this motion, which was followed by a written order on September 7.510
This order, known as the Mahan Order, required the government to return all 
property seized with the exception of materials pertaining to the ten BALCO 
players.511 The government moved for a stay of the Mahan Order because the 
evidence was otherwise lawfully in its possession pursuant to the May 6 
subpoena.512
499. Id. at 1122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
On November 1, 2004, Judge Mahan denied this motion based on the 
500. Id.
501. Id. at 1125 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
502. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2009); CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1125 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).
503. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1097.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 1094.
506. Id. at 1122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1094, 1122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
509. Id. at 1123 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
510. Id. at 1125 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
511. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2009).
512. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1094 n.22.  Judge Illston ultimately quashed the May 6 subpoena on 
December 10, 2004.  Id. at 1127–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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government’s failure to raise the subpoena argument at the original hearing.513
513. Id. at 1094 n. 22.
